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DIRKS v. SEC-A STUDY IN CAUSE AND EFFECT
BRUCE A. HILER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commitston' the Supreme Court un-
dertook, for the first time, to establish a standard for determining when
persons who are not corporate insiders but who receive material, non-
public information from an insider ("tippees") incur liability under sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 and rule lOb-5 s
thereunder, for trading in the securities of the affected issuer or for re-
vealing the information they receive to others who can reasonably be
expected to trade. Dirks, a securities trader and analyst, was formally
censured by the SEC for passing material, nonpublic information con-
cerning fraudulent activities at Equity Funding Corporation of America
(Equity Funding) to certain of his clients and investor colleagues.4 Dirks
had received nonpublic information that Equity Funding's assets were
* Branch Chief, Branch of Options and Special Studies, Division of Enforcement,
United States Securities and Exchange Commission. The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement of
any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessar-
ily reflect the view of the Commission or of the author's colleagues on the staff of the
Commission.
1. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
2. Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1983), reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
3. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
4. In re Raymond L. Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket No. 17, at 1401, 1412 (Feb. 3, 1981).
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"vastly overstated"5 from, among others, a former insider of the com-
pany. Some of those to whom Dirks revealed this information quickly
sold their holdings of Equity Funding stock and thereby avoided sub-
stantial losses when the massive fraud being conducted at the company
was eventually made public.6 Although he selectively revealed the in-
formation, Dirks also made certain efforts to convince others to publicize
what he had learned and has been generally recognized as having
played an important role in surfacing the Equity Funding scandal.7
Nevertheless, after an administrative proceeding, the SEC ruled
that Dirk's conduct aided and abetted violations of, among others, sec-
tion 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5 thereunder. The Com-
mission's decision was based on its view that one who knows or should
know that he has received material, nonpublic information from an in-
sider assumes the insider's duty either to disclose that information to
those with whom he trades or to refrain from trading.8 The SEC ruled
that a tippee breaches his assumed duty when he trades or tips others
who reasonably can be expected to trade on the information.9 The
5. 103 S. Ct. at 3258.
6. Id.
7. Id at 3259.
8. 21 S.E.C. Docket No. 17, at 1407, 1410 n.42. Brief for Respondent at 21-25, 30-31,
Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983) (arguing that Dirks acquired a duty to disclose by
participating in the insider's breach).
Although rule l0b-5 contains no express prohibition against trading on material, non-
public information, see supra note 3, the SEC and the courts have consistently interpreted the
rule to so provide. See generally 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURrIES FRAUD &
COMMODITIES FRAUD § 4.2 (1979); see also cases collected at id. § 2.2, at 462, 463 (1980)
(trading on material, nonpublic information treated as a violation of lOb-5). The basic prem-
ise of such liability has been that certain persons, such as corporate insiders, have a duty
either to disclose or to refrain from trading while in possession of material non-public infor-
mation to which they have access. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907, 912 (1961); In re Ward La France Truck Corp., 34 S.E.C. 373 (1943). The courts gener-
ally recognize that an insider owes a duty to disclose not only to existing shareholders but also
to anyone with whom he trades, for it would be "a sorry distinction to allow him to use the
advantage of his position to induce the buyer into the position of a beneficiary [i.e., a share-
holder], although he was forbidden to do so, once the buyer had become one." Gratz v.
Claughton, 187 F.2a 46,49 (2d Cir.),cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951), quoted in Cad, Roberts, 40
S.E.C. at 914 n.23 and Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (1979). This formu-
lation raises a prevailing issue concerning the true basis of an insider's duty to disclose to those
with whom he trades. Should it be seen as arising from a fiduciary relationship with the other
party to the transaction, or should it result from concepts such as the trader's "access" to
confidential information, the need for market integrity and the market's expectation of fair-
ness? This issue was central to Charella and Dirks and is the implicit focal point of much of
this article.
9. 21 S.E.C. Docket No. 17, at 1407, 1410 n.42,notedin Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. at 3259,
3262. An issue raised by the SEC's standard is whether the tip must be accompanied by
tippee trading in order to violate rule lOb-5. One commentator has suggested that tippee
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lower courts had generally endorsed these principles since the Second
Circuit's precedential Texas Gulf Sulphur decision.1 0 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed.1"
But the Supreme Court refused to accept the notion that a tippee
"assumes" an insider's duty to disclose by merely receiving what he
knows or should know is material, nonpublic inside information. 12 Rea-
trading is required since the mere tip does not itself constitute "deception," as required for
liability under the rule. See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiducia Principle." A Post
"Chiarella" Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1982). See also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1976) (absent deception or manipulation there is no 10b-5 violation).
But he notes several decisions suggesting to the contrary. Eg., SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F.
Supp. 1046, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Since rule l0b-5(c) proscribes conduct that operates or
"would operate" as a fraud or deceit upon any person, see supra note 3, it could be argued that
the act of tipping itself could violate the rules. See also section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933 ("Securities Act"), 15 U.S.C. 77q(a) (1976) (proscribing conduct "which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser"); 15 U.S.C. 77q(a)(3) (1976). But cf.
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that "if there is no
trading by tippees (or those to whom the tippees convey their information), there can be no
damages for tipping under § 10(b)'). The Second Circuit's reasoning in Elkind, however,
does not preclude an injunctive action since it recognizes that a duty to the corporation may
be breached despite the absence of tippee trading. See id. at 165 nn. 14-15; U.S. v. Newman,
664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983) (citing cases for the proposi-
tion that an injunctive action may be available to an issuer to stop tipping or trading on
nonpublic corporate information).
10. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (enunciating general rule that "anyone in possession of material
inside information must either disclose it to the investing public or . . .abstain from trading
in or recommending the securities concerned .... "). See SEC v. Lund, [1981-82 TRANSFER
BINDER] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,428 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1982) (summary judgment
denied); SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) (insider tipping merger
information to broker); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
236-38 (2d Cir. 1974) (tippees liable because they knew or had reason to know of confidential
corporate source of negative earnings information; duty to disclose runs to entire market-
place); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 702 (5th Cir. 1969) (plaintiff-tippee's
purchases on what he thought was an accurate tip subject to defense ofinparidelicto); Ross v.
Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("If [defendants] were not insiders they would
seem to have been 'tippees' . . . and are subject to the same duty as insiders.").
11. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 839 & n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
12. 103 S. Ct. at 3261-62. A distinction generally may be made between "market" or
"outside" information and "corporate" or "inside" information, the former referring to infor-
mation which affects the market for an issuer's securities but which generally does not affect
its assets or earning power and comes from sources outside of the issuer, see, e.g. , Oppenheimer
& Co., 46 S.E.C. 323, 323 n.2 (1976), and the latter referring to information which generally
comes from within the issuer and affects its assets or earnings. See, e.g., Fleischer, Mundehim
& Murphy, An Ini'tial Inquiy into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L.
REv. 798, 798-99 (1973), cited in Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240-41 n.1 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent in Chiarella, rejected this distinction for purposes of rule
lOb-5 liability, 445 U.S. at 240-41 n.1, while the majority specifically referred to "market"
information at several points in its opinion. Id. at 229, 231, 233-35. The Court stated its
holding in Chiarella in terms of "market" information: "We hold that a duty to disclose under
§ 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information." Id. at 235
(emphasis supplied). The Dirks Court rejects any legal distinction between "market" and
[VOL. 43:292
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soning from its holding in Chiarella v. United States, 3 that "mere posses-
sion of nonpublic market information" does not alone create a duty to
disclose, 4 the Court held that a tippee acquires an insider's duty to dis-
close or refrain from trading only if the tipping insider has breached a
fiduciary duty to shareholders in disclosing the information and the tip-
pee knows or should know that there has been such a breach. 5 More-
over, the Court stated that an insider breaches his duty only when he
"personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure."'"
Because Dirks was not himself an insider 7 and because, according to the
majority, the insiders who "tipped" him had not violated any duty to
Equity Funding's shareholders by telling Dirks of the company's illegal
conduct,18 the Court reversed the circuit court's affirmance of the SEC
censure. 19
The Dirks decision quickly was recognized as imposing new restric-
tions on the prohibition against trading on non-public information that
has developed under rule lOb-5,2 ° and as raising new questions about
the scope and object of the rule.' These questions arise from the
"inside" information under rule lOb-5. 103 S. Ct. at 3262 n.15. The terms, however, retain
their pratical use in defining the various fact patterns into which trading cases typically fall.
The terms will be used for that purpose in this article.
13. 445 U.S. 222 (1979).
14. Id. at 235.
15. 103 S. Ct. at 3258.
16. Id. at 3265.
17. Id. at 3266-67. The Court also noted that Dirks did not "induce the shareholders or
officers of Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence in him," or "misappropriate or ille-
gally obtain the information." Id. at 3267. The first observation may be meant to deal with
the continuing viability of the Supreme Court's decision in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (where a duty to disclose was imposed on outsiders of an issuer by
virtue of their undertaking to act on behalf of certain shareholders in the sale of their stock).
See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 229-30. The latter statement may be of significance to alternate
theories of liability under rule lOb-5 based on misappropriation of information as suggested
in id. at 238-239 (Stevens, J., concurring) and 239-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). These theo-
ries will be discussed later. See supra text accompanying notes 128-39 & 155-56.
18. 103 S. Ct. at 3267 & n.27. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall in a dissenting opinion, specifically disagreed with this conclusion. Id. at 3270, 3272 n. 13
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). He reasoned that the primary tipper, one Secrist, breached his
duty to shareholders in disclosing the information to Dirks under the theory that an insider
breaches his duty merely by virtue of making disclosures harmful to shareholders' interests.
Id. at 3270-71. Moreover, although he disagreed with the majority's notion that some benefit
to the insider is necessary to establish a breach of duty, Blackmun would have found a benefit
to Secrist simply in "the good feeling of exposing a fraud and his enhanced reputation." Id.
at 3272 n.13. The majority did not discuss those possibilities. See supra text accompanying
notes 12-16.
19. 103 S. Ct. at 3628.
20. See supra note 8.
21. See Wermiel, High Court's Decizon on Dirks May Make SEC's Pursuit of Insider Trading
Harder, Wall St. J., July 5, 1983, at 5, col. 1; Pitt & Ain, "Dirks" Deals Blow to SEC Insider
1984]
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Court's application of the common-law principles upon which it relies to
define its tippee liability standard and from the policy shift which un-
derlies the Court's articulation of those principles. The Court re-empha-
sizes the common-law principles that were relied upon in Chiarella to
determine when a duty to disclose or refrain from trading may be im-
posed, and makes it clear that, as at common law, the duty must arise
from a relationship of trust and confidence between theparties to the transac-
tion. Moreover, the Dzrks Court apparently standardizes this common-
law duty approach of Chiarella-a case involving market information-
as applicable to all cases of "silence" or nondisclosure of material facts
under rule 10b-5,22 whether the facts are considered to be market or
corporate information about the securities in which the violater trades.2 3
The Court's re-emphasis and uniform application of the principles of
Chiarella, despite the arguably limiting approach applied to that deci-
sion by the lower courts and the SEC, 4 brings interpretation of rule
Trading Progam, Legal Times, July It, 1983, at 10, col. 1; Noble, The Dirks Ruling- Insiders'
License?, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1983, at 29, col. 4; Sporkin, Set Back to SEC's Enforcement Drive,
N.Y. Times, July 17, 1983, at F2, col. 2.
22. 103 S. Ct. at 3262 n.15. It is important to note that Dirks, as well as the other cases
discussed in this article, involve, as far as rule lOb-5 is concerned, only violation of rule lOb-
5(a) and (c). Subparagraph (b) of rule lOb-5 prohibits statements containing misrepresenta-
tions or statements which are misleading because the speaker omits to state necessary material
facts. See supra note 3 for text of rule. The trading which Dirks was charged as aiding and
abetting by his tipping presents a case of total silence, or failure to disclose information affect-
ing the value of securities, and thus would be properly cognizable only under rule lOb-5(a)
and (c). This, of course, will normally be the case when transactions are effected in the open
market without face-to-face contact. See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 225-26 & n.5. But cf. Cady,
Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 913 (suggesting that clause (b) is violated in such cases based on "an
implied misrepresentation").
23. See supra note 12 for a discussion of the nature of market and inside information.
24. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 19 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
193 (1983) (allowing a criminal action for violation of rule lOb-5 on facts similar to Chiarella
on theory of misappropriation); O'Conner & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F.
Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (allowing action by option trader against two merging corpora-
tions, insiders of the corporations, and tippees on theory that breach of duty to corporation
supports option trader's action for damages under lOb-5); SEC v. Lund, [1981-82 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) $ 98,428 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1982) (defendant's summary
judgment motion denied in light of three viable theories: that the defendant outsider was a
tippee; that the outsider owed duty to issuer by virtue of relationship with tipping insider;
and that the outsider misappropriated the information); SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397
(1983) (judgment entered for SEC, after Dirks, on ground that tippee's business relationship
to tipper made him a temporary insider). But cf. Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704
F.2d 407, 412 (8th Cir. 1983) (denying private rule lOb-5 action and emphasizing need for
relationship of trust and confidence between the parties); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553
F. Supp. 1347, 1352-56 (S.D.N.Y), af'd, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983) (dismissal of private dam-
age action because no relationship between plaintiff and defendants), cert. deniedsub nom. Moss
v. Newman, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984). See generally Chazen, "Dirks" Presents Unique Corporate,
Social Issues, Legal Times, March 14, 1983, at 14, col. 1 (discussing limiting interpretations of
Chiarella, adopting theory of tippee liability accepted in Dirks).
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lOb-5 closer to the common-law concepts which it was developed to
replace.25
By referring to these restrictive principles, the Court announces its
new rules for the liability of tippees and tipping insiders. In doing so,
the Court clearly enunciates, as a primary policy in the area of trading
on nonpublic information, its concern for promotion of market effi-
ciency through the work of analysts and other market professionals and
for predictability of liability under rule lOb-5 by these persons and by
insiders who may pass confidential corporate information.2 6 Although
these goals are relevant to interpretation of the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws, the Court's logic and ruling significantly tip
the previous balance of the policies underlying those provisions: The
balance is swung from one favoring assurance of market integrity and
investor protection through close circumscription of the selective use of
confidential corporate information by insiders and all of their tippees to
one allowing selective and systematic dissemination of such information
to market professionals in the name of efficiency in pricing. Dirks stands
as a victory for the proponents of market efficiency as a justification for
insider trading. Any remnant of the "equal information" or "parity of
information" theory is gone.27 But more importantly, Dirks sounds the
25. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 690 (1983) ("[W]e have re-
peatedly recognized that securities laws combating fraud should be construed 'not technically
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes.' ") (brackets in original)
(quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963), citing in accord,
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)); 103 S. Ct. at 691 ("[T]he antifraud
provision of the federal securities laws are not co-extensive with common-law doctrines of
fraud. . . . [An important purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived
deficiences in the available common law protection."); White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 734
(9th Cir. 1974) (recognizing "the necessity of departing from the rigid standards of the com-
mon law if the goals of the securities laws are to be accomplished"). See also Justice Black-
mun's dissent in Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 248 ("[The purpose of the securities laws] is to ensure
the fair and honest functioning of impersonal national securities markets where common-law
protections have proved inadequate.") (citation omitted); Langevoort, Fraud and Deception by
Securities Professionals, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1247, 1261-62 (1983) ("Although the legislative intent
behind [the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws] suggests that common-law
fraud principles are a starting point for analysis, it also suggests a mode of interpretation
responsive principally to the particular types of abuse to which the laws are addressed rather
than to history."). See generally Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legis-
lative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627, 651 (1963) ("It is clear that Congress was conscious of the
fact that it was changing the law of fraud.").
26. 103 S. Ct. at 3263-66 nn.17-18 & 24; see infra text accompanying notes 68-69.
27. The equal information or parity of information theory rests on the premise that the
best way to achieve the goals of fairness and market efficiency under the securities laws is to
allow all investors relatively equal access to material information. Thus, it is reasoned, all
trading on material information which is not generally available is fraudulent. See generally
Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d at 835 & n.14 (discussing the information theory and alternatives);
1984]
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death knell for a middle-ground approach to outlawing insider trading
based on the justifiable expectations of the marketplace as defined by
notions of fairness and market integrity.
After briefly sketching the Chiarella decision, this article will discuss
the reasoning of the Dirks decision, will evaluate the effectiveness and
the ramifications of the legal principles and the policy shift which the
Court endorses, and will discuss the uncertainties which the decision fos-
ters. In response to the Court's permissive rules of tippee liability, the
article will suggest a possible judicial broadening of those rules. Finally,
this article will explore the effects of the Court's duty analysis in
Chizarella and Dirks on the development of legal theories in cases involv-
ing trading on nonpublic information-specifically, theories of liability
for both outsiders and insiders trading on market information and for
outsiders trading on inside information.
II. CHIARELLA -UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
At the outset, the Court in Dirks refines and re-emphasizes the duty
concepts it endorsed in Chiarella. Chiarella, while employed by a finan-
cial printer, was able to discern the confidential identity of takeover
targets of certain of his employer's clients from tender offer materials
that he was preparing. He then purchased securities of the targets, reap-
ing profits when the price of the securities rose after the tender offer
announcements. 8 Chiarella was indicted and convicted of criminal vio-
lations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed his conviction, reasoning that "anyone. . .who
regularly receies material nonpublic information may not use that infor-
mation to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to
disclose."'29 The circuit court thus adopted a modified version of the so-
called parity of information theory.3"
The Supreme Court reversed Chiarella's conviction, holding that
"mere possession of market information" does not create a "duty to dis-
close" on which can be based a violation of rule 10b-5 for trading on
nonpublic information.' The Court embraced the common-law fraud
Brudny, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93
HARV. L. REV. 322passim (1979) (supporting a modified parity of information theory).
28. 445 U.S. at 224.
29. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).
30. The Second Circuit's position in Chiare/la is not a strict adoption of the parity theory.
Rather the court based its rule on the notion that it is unfair to allow those who occupy
"strategic places in the market mechanism" to trade on non-public information which they
"regularly" receive merely by virtue of those "strategic" positions. Chiare/la, 588 F.2d at 1365.
31. 445 U.S. at 235. This holding is not directly responsive to the Second Circuit's stan-
dard because that standard rested on more than mere possession of market information.
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precept that such a duty arises from "a relationship of trust and
confidence."
3 2
Chiare/la, thus, largely resolved the argument between those who
would create a general obligation to refrain from trading on nonpublic
information based solely on the notions of fairness and market integrity,
which underlie the parity of information theory, and those who would
limit the obligation to disclose by some reference to common-law con-
cepts of fiduciary relationships. But the Court left unanswered impor-
tant issues concerning the nature and origin of possible duties which
may form the basis for liability under rule 10b-5. The language of the
opinion suggests that a duty to disclose to the other party to the transac-
tion may be the exclusive duty a breach of which is sufficient to support
a rule 10b-5 violation.3" The opinion also suggests that such a duty
must arise from a relationship between the transacting parties.34 If both
of these premises are endorsed, liability under rule 10b-5 may be limited
to those who have an existing fiduciary relationship with the party with
whom they happen to trade-an extremely restrictive result.
Apparently recognizing this, several concurring or dissenting jus-
tices attempted to narrow the majority opinion to mean only that a per-
son trading on market information must breach "some duty."3 " Limiting
the Court's holding in this way leaves open the possibility of distinguish-
32. 445 U.S. at 228 ("[T]he duty to disclose arises when one party has information 'that
the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust
and confidence between them.' ") (brackets in original) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)) (additional citations omitted); id. at 230 ("Silence in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10(b) ....
But such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and
confidence between parties to a transaction."); id. at 231-32 ("The Court of Appeals like the
trial Court, failed to identify a relationship between petitioner and the sellers that could give
rise to a duty."); id. at 233 ("Formulation of... a broad duty, which departs radically from
the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties,.
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent.").
33. Id. at 228 ("[Olne who fails to disclose material information prior to the consumma-
tion of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so."); id. at 229 ("The
cases have also emphasized, in accordance with the common-law rule, that '[t]he party
charged with failing to disclose market information must be under a duty to disclose it.' ")
(brackets in original) (citation omitted); id. at 232 ("[T]he element required to make silence
fraudulent-a duty to disclose-is absent in this case."). See Langevoort, supra note 9, at 50
n.201; Pitt & Ain, supra note 21, at 15, col. 1 (suggesting that absent an affirmative misstate-
ment, the trader must be under a duty to disclose to incur rule 10b-5 liability).
34. See supra note 32.
35. Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment in Chiarella, took issue with the sugges-
tion in the majority opinion that "no violation of § 10(b) could be made out absent a breach
of some duty arising out of afduciay relationship between buyer andseller." Id. at 239 (emphasis
added). He agreed with the Chief Justice's dissenting view that an absolute duty to disclose
may arise from misappropriation of non-public information. Id.; see also id. at 237-38 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (defendant owed duty of silence to employer's customers); id. at 251
1984] 299
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ing cases of trading on inside information or of basing liability, and even
a duty to disclose, on the defendant's breach of some duty which he may
owe to a third party.3 6 After Chiare/la, the lower courts and private liti-
gants advanced several alternate theories of liability for trading on mar-
ket information in cases in which there was no preexisting relationship
between transacting parties upon which to base a duty to disclose. One
such theory, the so-called "misappropriation theory," as developed in
United States v. Newman," rests not on a duty to disclose to those with
whom one deals in the marketplace but rather on a breach of the duties
of "honesty, loyalty and silence" 3 owed to the source of confidential
information or to agents to whom the source has entrusted the informa-
tion.39 A second misappropriation theory, advanced by Chief Justice
Burger in his dissent in Chiarella, does rest on a duty to disclose. The
Chief Justice posited that anyone who misappropriates confidential in-
formation automatically incurs a duty to disclose to those with whom he
trades, regardless of the lack of any pre-existing relationship between the
transacting parties.4 ° These theories appeared as viable alternatives
under the Chiarella Court's duty analysis because of the questions which
the opinion left open.
The Dirks opinion, in its general discussion of the elements of a
duty to disclose, sheds new light on the questions raised by Chiarella, and
concomittantly affects post-Chiarella theories of liability for trading on
nonpublic information. The next section of this article will analyze the
reasoning and the policy shift which the Dirks Court endorses in setting
down its new rules of tippee liability. After discussing the resulting un-
certainties, it will suggest a judicial response to those uncertainties. A
discussion of the effect of the Court's reasoning and rules on the duty
issues raised in this section will be the subject of the last section of this
article.
III. TIPPEE LIABILITY: THE NEW POLICY
A. Derivation of the Rules of Tippee Liability
The Dirks Court relies heavily on its holding in Chiarella that "mere
possession" of nonpublic market information is insufficient to create a
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (defendant cannot trade on information resulting from a structural
informational disparity).
36. See cases cited supra note 24.
37. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. dented, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983). See infra text accompany-
ing notes 132-38 (discussion of facts in Newman).
38. 664 F.2d at 16.
39. Id. at 17-18.
40. 445 U.S. at 239-45.
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duty to disclose. The SEC sought to limit the application of Chiarella to
cases involving market information and to impose a duty to disclose on
all who possess inside information by virtue of the confidential, corpo-
rate nature of the information.4 1 But the Court, expanding on the con-
cepts of Chiarella, specifically refused to treat mere possession of inside
information any differently than the mere possession of market
information:
As we emphasized in Chiarella, mere possession of non-public
information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain;
only a speific relationship does that. And we do not believe that
the mere receipt of information from an insider creates such a
special relationship between the tippee and the corporation's
shareholders.4"
Thus the Court viewed Chiarella as announcing the basis for liabil-
ity in all cases of trading on undisclosed information: "Chiarel/a made it
explicitly clear that there is no general duty to forego market transac-
tions 'based on material nonpublic information.'
Relying on the common-law notion that only a "specific relation-
ship" creates a duty to disclose, the Dirks Court held that an outsider-
tippee, who has no special relationship to the corporation or its share-
holders, must derive a duty to disclose from an insider's breach of his
fiduciary duty to shareholders: "[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to
shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic infor-
mation only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee
knows or should know that there has been a breach."'  Noting that "a
purpose of the securities laws was to eliminate 'use of inside information
for personal advantage,' "" the Court stated that an insider breaches his
fiduciary duty by tipping information only if he "personally will benefit,
directly or indirectly, from his disclosure."4 6 In the absence of a benefit
to the insider, a tippee is apparently unrestricted in his trading on, or
41. 103 S. Ct. at 3262 n.15.
42. Id. (emphasis added). The Court specifically noted the SEC's proffered distinction
between "inside" and "market" information, but mistakenly reversed the definitions-refer-
ring to the latter as " 'information generated within the company relating to assets or earn-
ings,' Brief for Respondent 23." The Court continued: "This Court drew no such distinction
in Chiarella, and, as the CHIEF JUSTICE noted, '[iut is clear that § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by
their terms and by their history make no such distinction.' " Id.
43. Id..at 3267 n.27.
44. Id. at 3264.
45. Id. at 3265 (citing Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 n.15).
46. Id.
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tipping of others for the purpose of trading on, nonpublic inside
information.
But the Court is not writing in a vacuum. It has just revised an
entire body of law that defined liability for trading on nonpublic inside
information by reference to the notion that concern for fairness and
market integrity demands relatively equal access to information mate-
rial to investment decisions. The parity of information theory had its
roots in the SEC's seminal decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co . and was
more expansively articulated in the Second Circuit's Texas Gulf Sulphur
opinion and later SEC decisions. 8 In Cady, Roberts the SEC found that
47. 40 S.E.C. 911 (1961).
48. A commentator who assisted in writing the Cad, Roberts opinion, see Symposium,
Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAw. 1009, 1009 (1966) (discussion among William L. Cary,
Arthur Fleischer, Jr., and Thomas A. Halleran), posited, just prior to the Second Circuit
opinion in Texas GulfSulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) that "the federal securities laws...
may be interpreted to impose a duty of disclosure if the expectations of the market place
necessarily contemplate such a requirement." Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Informa-
tion Practices- The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1279
(1965) (footnote omitted). The Second Circuit adopted this approach, stating: "[T]he rule
(10b-5) is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all
investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material informa-
tion. . . ." Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848 (citing Symposium, supra, at 1010; Fleischer,
supra, at 1278-80). The court stated that the expectations of the marketplace require impos-
ing a duty to disclose on anyone who possesses material nonpublic inside information. Id.
The SEC specifically adopted the Second Circuit's approach in In re Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968), in which it held an underwriter liable for
selective disclosure of negative information which it had obtained as managing underwriter.
Then, in In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971), the SEC held one of the
tippees of the respondent in Merrill Lynch liable merely because it knew or had reason to know
that the material information it received "was nonpublic and had been obtained improperly
by selective revelation or otherwise .... " Id. at 641, 643. The SEC dramatically expressed
its adoption of an approach based on the expectations of the market and fairness:
A number of cases have not only established that the antifraud prohibitions em-
brace transactions by persons who occupy a special relationship to the issuer giving
them access to nonpublic information, but have indicated that under certain cir-
cumstances they extend to transactions by others who have received such informa-
tion as a result of its selective disclosure.
Id. at 639.
We reject the contentions advanced by respondents that no violation can be found
unless it is shown that the recipient himself occupied a special relationship with the
issuer or insider corporate source giving him access to nonpublic information, or, in
the absence of such relationship, that he had actual knowledge that the information
was disclosed in a breach of fiduciary duty not to reveal it.
Id. at 643. But cf. id. at 648-51 (Comm'r Smith, concurring) (expressing concern for the role of
analysts; interpreting Cady, Roberts, Texas Gulf Sulphur, and Merrill Lynch as having emphasized
"the conduct of corporate insiders and their privies" and expressing preference for a rule,
endorsed in Dirks, requiring a breach of duty by an insider to impose liability on an outsider).
The notion that the marketplace expects and is owed disclosure of nonpublic inside
information was confirmed in a line of cases from the Second Circuit. Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974), cited with approval in
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a broker-dealer firm and one of its partners violated rule 10b-5 when
they traded for select customers in the securities of an issuer while in
possession of material, nonpublic information concerning a dividend cut
at the issuer. The information had been obtained from a partner in the
firm who was also a director of the issuer. The Dirks Court summarizes
the Cady, Roberts decision as one in which the SEC found that breach of
the common-law "affirmative duty of disclosure"4 9 satisfied the elements
of a rule lOb-5 violation.50 The Court thus apparently concludes that in
Cady, Roberts, the SEC adopted common-law standards as the basis for
rule 10b-5 liability. 5'
The SEC did look to the existing common-law duty of an insider to
impose an additional obligation on an insider under rule lOb-5 not to
trade on nonpublic, inside information. 52 But it emphasized that in es-
tablishing principles for liability under rule 10b-5, it would depart from
the common law and seek to serve its mission to protect all investors.5 3
In fact, the SEC adopted very broad elements in Cady, Roberts for deter-
mining when persons other than insiders would be liable for trading
while in possession of confidential information. After noting that "the
antifraud provisions are phrased in terms of 'any person' " and that of-
Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261, n.14; Elkind v. Liggett & Meyers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123, 128
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd in part on other grounds and afl'd in part, 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980). In
those two cases the courts allowed damage actions against persons trading on inside informa-
tion by everyone who trades in the marketplace contemporaneously with the defendants.
Thus, the courts imposed a duty to disclose running to the entire market and not just share-
holders. Such a duty, it seems, must rest to some extent on the expectations of the market and
not simply a relationship of trust between buyer and seller.
Finally, as pointed out supra text accompanying notes 28-36, the Second Circuit in its
opinion in Chiarella opted for a test based on the concept of fairness and the expectations of
the market, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Dirks also
cogently expressed its preference for such an approach. See Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1365-68;
Dirks, 681 F.2d at 835 & n.14.
49. 103 S. Ct. at 3260.
50. Id.
51. Pitt & Ain, supra note 21, at 13, col. 1 (interpreting Cad, Roberts as a case in which
"the SEC predicated the duty of insiders under Rule 10b-5 . ..on [their] common law
duty").
52. 40 S.E.C. at 911. ("An affirmative duty to disclose material information has been
traditionally imposed on corporate 'insiders,' particularly officers, directors or controlling
stockholders.") The quoted language suggests the SEC's belief that the three categories do
not encompass all those who could be considered insiders. Also, the SEC noted that the
majority state rule did not impose such an obligation, id. at 911 n. 13, thus signalling its inten-
tion not to be bound by common law.
53. See id. at 910 ("So many times that citation is unnecessary, we have indicated that the
purchase and sale of securities is a field in special need of regulation for the protection of
investors."); id. at 911 ("These antifraud provisions ... are designed to encompass the infi-
nite variety of devices by which undue advantge may be taken of investors and others.").
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ficers, directors and controlling shareholders traditionally have a duty
not to trade on nonpublic information, the SEC stated:
These three groups, however, do not exhaust the classes of per-
sons upon whom there is such an obligation. Analytically, the
obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the existence
of a relationship gt'vg access, directly or indirectly, to informa-
tion intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. 4
These elements, apparently applicable to any party, are indeed expan-
sive.55 The "relationship" requirement is stated in broad terms of "ac-
cess" to information intended for a corporate purpose-not in terms of
fiduciary responsibilities. The generally stated concern for fairness, al-
though apparently limited by the first element of access, brings the stan-
dard for imposing liability close to a standard premised on the parity
theory-relatively equal access by investors to material information.
Undaunted by this broad language and policy concern, the Dirks
Court, ostensibly relying on Cady, Roberts, ties the imposition of an obli-
gation to disclose nonpublic information before trading to common-law
concepts of fiduciary relationships. The Court first recognizes that in
Cady, Roberts, "[t]he SEC found that not only did breach of [an insider's]
common-law duty. . . establish the elements of a Rule 10b-5 violation,
but that individuals other than corporate insiders could be obligated
either to disclose . . . or to abstain from trading altogether. '56 But, ap-
54. Id. at 912 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Although the SEC went on to state: "Thus our task here is to identify those persons
who are in a special relationships with a company and privy to its internal affairs, and
thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in securities," id., the overwhelming thrust of the
opinion demonstrates a willingness to depart from common-law standards for determining
such duties, if necessary to protect investors and advance the policies of the securities laws.
Indeed, Cady, Roberts held that a tippee who personally had no relationship with the issuer was
liable under rule lOb-5 although the SEC specifically noted facts demonstrating an absence of
any breach of duty by the tipper. Id. at 917. See also In re Investors Management Co., 44
S.E.C. 633 (1971), discussed supra note 48, in which the SEC rejected the argument that there
is no violation absent a relationship affording access. Note also the divergence from strict
common-law duty analysis in Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 920 (1951) which the Chiarella Court cited approvingly to justify holding insiders liable
for impersonal, open market sales of securities to nonshareholders based on nonpublic inside
information. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 n.8.
55. Under a broad reading, the Cady, Roberts standard would prohibit the conduct of
Messrs. Chiarella and Dirks regardless of their lack of any fiduciary or trust relationship to
trading shareholders. See Fleischer, supra note 48, at 1282; Ruder, supra note 25, at 667-70;
Comment, The Prospects For Rule X-1O1B-5." An Emerging Remedyfor Deyrauded Investors, 59 YALE
L. REV. 1120, 1142-44 (1950).
56. 103 S. Ct. at 3260 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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parently creating a general standard for liability under rule lOb-5 for
trading on nonpublic information, the Court states:
In Chiarella, we accepted the two elements set out in Cady, Rob-
erts for establishing a Rule lOb-5 violation: "(i) the existence
of a relationship affording access to nside nbformation intended
to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the un-
fairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that
information by trading without disclosure."57
The subtle changes in the Cady, Roberts standard and the blending
of Chiarella-a case involving market information-with Cady, Roberts
and Dirks is not incidental. Rather, it evinces the Court's view that
under the federal securities laws, liability for trading on nonpublic infor-
mation-whether market or inside information-is premised on the
breach of the type of fiduciary duty imposed on an insider at common
law. The majority in Dirks thus limits the class of relationships upon
which a duty can be based to a narrower class than that contemplated
by the notion of "a relationship affording access" advanced in Cady,
Roberts.
The second element of the Cady, Roberts standard, unfairness, which
describes "the harm that the duty protects against, '" is restrictively re-
phrased by the Dirks Court in terms of the unfairness of allowing a cor-
porate insider to take advantage of confidential inside information. The
Court thus views the unfairness in trading on nonpublic information as
tied to an insider's misuse of that information. This limitation is also
inconsistent with the principles enunciated in Cady, Roberts. It seems ba-
sic to any concept of fairness that shareholders and potential sharehold-
ers of a company who enter the securities markets should not have to
compete with anyone who has the advantage of having received inside
information to which those shareholders do not have access and which
was to redound to the benefit of all shareholders. Because inside infor-
mation, as the Dirks Court concedes, is "intended only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,"59 liability should
properly rest not on whether an insider has breached a duty in tipping
the information, but rather on the unfairness of allowing any "party [to
take] advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing. "60
The Court's modification of the fairness concept of Cady, Roberts
57. Id. (citing 445 U.S. at 227)(emphasis added).
58. Id. at 3271 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
60. Id. Although this would seem to require adopting a strict parity rule, it may be modi-
fied according to how unavailability is defined. Professor Brundy, for example, would outlaw
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goes a long way towards reversing the prior development of rule 10b-5.
Cady, Roberts was only a starting point, and the SEC and the courts soon
focused implicitly on the principle of "fairness" which seems to have
been the real concern of Cady, Roberts.61 This led to the development of
rule 10b-5 based on the rationale that investor confidence was enhanced
through application of the rule by reference to considerations of what
constitutes the "justifiable expectations of the marketplace" in disclosure
of nonpublic information prior to trading in securities.6 2 In fact, the
Second Circuit in Chiarella opted for a version of this approach, appar-
ently based on the Cady, Roberts elements of "access" and "fairness."
63
And the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit in Dirks, in a lengthy footnote, noted the long existing
tension "between the 'information' theory and the 'fiduciary' theory"
and expressed its preference for a middle-ground theory, based on "the
two major ideals of the federal securities laws: fairness to investors and
efficient markets for capital."'
The Supreme Court in Chiarella and Dirks, however, has chosen a
restrictive common-law approach to rule 10b-5, disregarding the mid-
dle-ground approach advanced by the appellate courts in those cases.
The Court's strict reference to the common law forecloses the develop-
ment of the proper expectations regarding the use of nonpublic informa-
tion in today's complex securities markets. Any surviving notion of
liability based on the Cadj, Roberts concepts of "access" and "unfairness"
is to be viewed from the rigid classifications of an insider's duty at com-
mon law, not the remedial purposes of the federal securities laws.6 5
trading if the trader has an "unerodeable informational advantage," i.e., access to informa-
tion that may not be obtained lawfully by others. Brundy, supra note 27, at 353-68.
61. See supra note 48; see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 248-51 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing Cad y, Roberts and evolution of rule lOb-5).
62. See supra note 48; see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 248-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63. The Second Circuit's rule would have outlawed trading on nonpublic market infor-
mation by those with "regular" access to information that they did not create by their own
skill or judgment. See supra notes 12, 27; Chiare/la, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365-66 (2d Cir. 1978).
For the securities markets to function properly, it is essential that those who
occupy such strategic places in the market mechanism be forbidden to reap personal
gains from information received by virtue of their position.
A test of "regular access to market information" appears to us to provide a
workable rule. There should be no greater difficulty in resolving close cases than is
inherent in determining who is a "corporate insider" under Texas Gulf Sulphur.
Id. (citation omitted).
64. Dirks, 681 F.2d at 835 n.14. (Judge Wright believed that the two goals were served by
limiting Chiare/la to cases involving market information and adopting the SEC's approach to
liability for tippees of inside information.)
65. The rigid standards of the common law seem singularly ill suited for application to
the complexities and expectations of modern securities transactions. As the Senate Commit-
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The Court articulates a reason for its restriction of the Cady, Roberts
"access" and "fairness" standard: "Imposing a duty to disclose or ab-
stain solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic in-
formation from an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting
influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes
is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market."6 6 The remainder
of the opinion is dominated by justification of the Court's new rules of
tippee-liability through general reference to the benefits that market
analysts confer on the securities markets by contributing to "efficiency
in pricing. '"67
The importance of the Court's preference for the role of analysts
and market professionals cannot be understated. The Court, reluctant
to support a rule that might ensnare all recipients of market information
in Chiarella,6 now extends that reluctance to cases involving inside in-
formation. Any question of whether market professionals can utilize
either market or inside information seems largely resolved in favor of
allowing trading.
B. Policy Bass for the Rules
Supporting its holding, which allows analysts to trade on nonpublic
information absent any benefit to an insider, the Court notes that "the
tee reporting out the Exchange Act stated, "so delicate a mechanism as the modern [securities
markets] cannot be regulated efficiently under a rigid statutory program." S. REP. No. 792,
73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1934).
66. 103 S. Ct. at 3263 (footnote omitted).
67. Id. at 3263 n.17. See Pitt & Ain, supra note 21, at 13, col. 2 ("This preoccupation with
the effect of the SEC's theories on market professionals permeates the Court's Dirks decision
68. See 445 U.S. at 232-35.
In Chiarella, the Court justified its concern over a general prohibition of trading on
material, nonpublic market information by reference to the "detailed and sophisticated regu-
lation" of the uses of market information which have evolved even to allow, in some instances,
selective use of such information. Id. at 233. One provision commonly cited as an example of
how Congi-ss has specifically legislated an allowable informational advantage involving mar-
ket information is section 1 l(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78k(a) (1983). That section
prohibits market professionals from trading for their own accounts while in possession of non-
public market information received by virtue of their position, but specifically exempts ex-
change specialists, i.e., firms that make a market in specific securities traded on a national
exchange. This proves little. The history of the SEC's opposition to such trading, as well as
its consideration of total segregation of broker and dealer functions even as to specialists on
the exchanges, is well chronicled. See J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL
STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SEC AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 75, 100, 121, 145-49,
177-78, 236 (1982). That Congress and the SEC have dealt with specific allowable informa-
tional advantages by statute and rulemaking, it could be argued, indicate the intention other-
wise to disallow such advantages. The specific provisions of the federal securities laws that
allow utilization of these advantages need not be usurped by application of rule lOb-5.
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information analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as
to the market worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's judg-
ment in this respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to
clients of the firm."69 The Court concludes that "[i]t is the nature of this
type of information. . . that [it] cannot be made simultaneously avail-
able to all of the corporation's stockholders or the public generally."7 °
Accepting this suspect conclusion as true, it begs the real question: Why
should analysts and their selected clients be entitled to trade on material,
nonpublic inside information before shareholders or the general public
receives that information? The Court's main task is to explain how a
rule allowing such inequity benefits the market, the corporation's share-
holders, or anyone other than those fortunate enough to have access to
an analyst who has access to a corporate insider.
The Court relies on the efficiency arguments often advanced by
those who would remove any prohibition on insider trading. Those ar-
guments generally are premised on two basic assumptions: that trading
on inside information is an economical means of compensating corpo-
rate executives and that market efficiency in pricing securities is ad-
vanced by allowing even indirect injection of significant information
into the market.7 1 The Supreme Court rejects the notion that insider
trading is a permissible form of compensation.7 2 Rather, its new rules
are based on the market efficiency rational for insider trading. This
leads back to the initial question in more specific terms: Do the specific
benefits to be obtained by allowing a stock price to rise to its "efficient"
level through trading on inside information outweigh the damage that
may be done to market integrity? Indeed, is there any guarantee, or
even a reasonable certainty, that the price will rise "efficiently" through
trading on nonpublic inside information? More importantly, one must
ask whether there is any alternative method of allowing dissemination of
inside information without the harm to shareholders and to market in-
tegrity attendant to the Court's rules. This article will not analyze in
depth the arguments against the market efficiency justification for inside
trading. But to understand the implications of the Dirks decision, it is
important to note what the Court does and does not consider important
69. 103 S. Ct. at 3263 (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. See generally H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) (analyz-
ing and defending insider trading); Seligman, An Economic Defense of Insider Trading; FORTUNE,
Sept. 5, 1983, at 847 (overview of Manne's argument). See also Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule
14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAw. 517, at 525-26 (1982) (analysts'
use of nonpublic information increases market efficiency).
72. This is obvious from the personal benefit test. If an insider benefits from a tip, he may
incur liability under the Dirks rule. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
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to justify its new rules. This section first will compare the benefits to
market efficiency to be derived from the Dirks standards and those to be
derived from the SEC's position. It will then focus on the shifting of the
risks involved in market transactions which the Court's market effi-
ciency policy entails and on the resulting uncertainties in determining
liability under rule lOb-5.
I. Is There a Need for a New Rule?-The Dirks majority accepted
that but for Dirks' facilitation of selected persons' sales of Equity Fund-
ing stock and the resulting fall in the stock's price, the Equity Funding
scandal would not have surfaced-at least when it did.7 3 But allowing
trading on nonpublic information by a select few to guard against recur-
rence of the "extraordinary facts"74 in Dirks, would be a case of making
the cure worse than the illness. The Court is more generally concerned
with efficient securities markets and the "serious ramificaitons on report-
ing of investment views," 75 which the Court believes that the SEC's rule
could entail. But allowing insider trading, or any tippees to trade on
nonpublic information, will not necessarily ensure that all information
relevant to the valuation of securities is reflected immediately in the
marketplace. Even in instances of a major event in the life of a corpora-
tion, such as a merger, an acquisition, or a major fraud as in Diks, most
persons with access to inside information will try to minimize the market
effect of their trades. Any market reaction to their buying or selling may
decrease their profits when favorable information becomes public or
may hamper their efforts to avoid losses before the announcement of
negative news. The Court's rules also increase the instances in which
the select few with access to nonpublic information may misjudge its
ultimate effect on the market or in which persons may gain access to
premature or inconsistent information and buy or sell affected securities
in volumes or at prices which will create inefficiencies. Moreover, the
market reaction to trading activity that is premised on nonpublic infor-
mation may adversely affect confidential corporate negotiations or pro-
posed transactions.
The SEC's pre-Dirks rule arguably preserved the efficiency of the
securities markets as well as do the Court's rules. Prior to Dirks, it was
generally accepted that analysts should be allowed only "to obtain from
management corporate information for purposes of 'filling in the "inter-
73. 103 S. Ct. at 3258-59, 3259 n.8, 3263 n.18.
74. Id. at 3265.
75. Id. at 3263 n.18.
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stices in analysis". . ' "76 The Dirks Court rejects this as insufficient
to allow analysts to form investment "judgments."" The Court's rules
clearly allow analysts to trade legally on material nonpublic information.
The Court may be concerned that without a rule permitting the use of
material information, analysts will be missing little bits and pieces of
important information that are helpful to all market participants. But,
true analysis has a large base of public information already available on
which to proceed, and, indeed, presumes an absence of additional infor-
mation.78 And the SEC's rule does not restrict an analyst from trading
on nonpublic information that results from an analysis of various non-
material, nonpublic facts. The prohibition rather comes into play only
when one finds a true corporate asset-information material in itself or
in light of additional salient facts.79
The weakness of the Court's market efficiency justification is evi-
dent even in the Dirks opinion. While seeking to justify its new tippee-
liability rules by relying on the importance of the work of analysts "to
ferret out and analyze information . . . "80 the Court admits that
Dirks' conduct did not fall within these parameters: "[Dirks] uncovered
startling information that required no analysis or exercise ofjudgment as
to its market relevance.""1 The Court thus legally approves of Dirks'
conduct, while distinguishing it from the conduct which the Court's new
rule is designed to promote. Moreover, the Court recognizes that inside
76. Id. at 3263 n. 17 (quoting SEC's brief, Brief for Respondent at 42, which quoted Inves-
tors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. at 646.
77. Id. ("This rule is inherently imprecise, and imprecision prevents parties from ordering
their actions in accord with legal requirements.").
78. The SEC and Corporate Disclosure "A Program by Committee on Federal Regulation of Secun'-
ties," 36 Bus. LAw. 119, 138 (1980) (comments by C. Reed Parker) (discussing effect of in-
creased information on the role of market analysts); see also West, Timely Disclosure - The View
From 11 Wall Street, 11 Sw. L.J. 241, 244 (1970) ("[T]he competent security analyst depends
on his professional skills and his broad industry knowledge in making evaluations and does
not need to depend on inside information which would provide him with an unfair
advantage.").
79. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 942 (2d Cir. 1979) (nonpublic corporate
information concerning proposed financing lacked sufficient specificity to bring any duty to
disclose or abstain into operation); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 14-15 (2d Cir.
1977) (duty to disclose arises when information would have considerable effect on the market
price of the security); see also TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)
(For a fact omitted from a proxy solicitation to be material "there must be substantial likeli-
hood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable inves-
tor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available."). The lower
courts have generally applied this standard in rule lOb-5 cases. See Elkind v. Liggett & My-
ers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 1980); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1266 & n.8
(9th Cir. 1979).
80. 103 S. Ct. at 3263 n.17 (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 3263 n.18.
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information is a "corporate asset" which insiders must not mismanage
but which, under the Court's policy, can be made available to select
outsiders before being directly disclosed to the owners of the corporation
(its shareholders). The owners must rely on receiving an uncertain and,
at best, indirect notice of the information by interpretation of market
movements to be spurred by the outsiders' riskless use of the
information.
The most significant omission in the Dirks opinion is the failure to
discuss whether its overriding concern for market analysis, or "efficiency
in pricing," is paramount, as the Court has made it, under the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws. As the SEC repeatedly emphasized in
Cady, Roberts, "investor protection" from all types of frauds and inequi-
ties in the market was in fact the paramount concern of the securities
laws.8 2 It is difficult to reconcile the Court's presumption of a general
interest in efficiency in pricing with the long established and Congressio-
nally mandated concern for market integrity and fairness. This is espe-
cially so in view of the increasing of risks to investors which results from
the Court's application of that policy.
2. Unexplained ShiRing of Risks to Investors. -The Court addresses
the obvious objection that under its rule unsuspecting shareholders will
be trading with better informed outsiders, by noting: "as market values
fluctuate and investors act on inevitably incomplete or incorrect infor-
mation, there are always winners and losers; but those who have 'lost'
have not necessarily been defrauded." 3 They have entered the market,
so the argument goes, voluntarily, the market price having been right
for them. This, of course, is obviously true, but it neither addresses the
inherent unfairness of the situation or the potential harm to market in-
tegrity, nor justifies increasing the number of winners and losers-the
inevitable result of the Court's rule. An analyst may be undecided as to
an investment decision, but as he receives material nonpublic informa-
tion, barring illegality, he certainly will enter the market, along with
many of his clients. If the market price is affected by this added volume,
more "losers" may enter the market. Thus, the Court has shifted the
82. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also cases cited supra note 25; Baird v.
Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir. 1944) (Clark, J., dissenting in part) ("One of the primary
purposes of Congress in enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was to protect the
general investing public."); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944) ("[T]he essential objective of securities legislation is to protect
those who do not know market conditions from the over-reaching of those who do."); U.S. v.
Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774 (1979) ("[Bloth this Court and Congress have emphasized the
importance of the [Securities Act] in protecting investors .... .
83. 103 S. Ct. at 3267 n.27.
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risks that the inevitable "winners and losers" undertake as they enter the
market in response to price movements.
Market traders inevitably have "incomplete or inaccurate" infor-
mation to the extent that the law recognizes that a corporation has a
legitimate interest in conducting certain of its business in private.8 4
Congress, and the SEC, through the disclosure provisions of the federal
securities laws85 and the courts in case law8 6 have sought to adjust cor-
porations' need for confidentiality against shareholders' need for ade-
quate, accurate, and timely corporate information. The Dirks Court has
readjusted the existing balance between the competing interests without
reference to this body of law. If more timely market disclosure is neces-
sary, the Court should consider whether some adjustment of corpora-
tions' obligation to disseminate inside information may be a more
appropriate means.
Obviously, difficult issues involving the timing and the manner of
84. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur & Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) ("We do not suggest that material facts must be dis-
closed immediately; the timing of disclosure is a matter for the business judgment of the
corporate officers. . . within the affirmative disclosure requirements promulgated by the ex-
changes and by the SEC."); Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAw. 1009, 1023-26 (1966) (com-
ments of Thomas A. Halleran, member of New York Bar); Fleischer, supra note 48, at 1295,
1299-1300.
85. See e.g, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1983); id. § 78m(a) (periodic reports as the SEC prescribes by
rule); id. § 78m(d) (information required in event of five percent beneficial ownership of eq-
uity securities); id. § 78m(e) (information as required by rules in event of issuer repurchase);
id. § 78n (information required in event of proxy solicitation or tender offer); id. § 78o(d)
(periodic reports of certain issuers); id. § 78p(a) (information required of officers, directors, or
ten percent beneficial owners); see also Securities Act Release No. 5092, [1970] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 77,915 (Oct. 15, 1970) (discussing duty of prompt disclosure); Securities Act
Release No. 5699, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,461, at 86,202-03
(reminding issuers of duty of prompt disclosure of material facts); NYSE COMPANY GUIDE
SECTION A-Z, PART II (obligation of listed companies to make prompt disclosure); AMEX
COMPANY GUIDE PART 4, § 402(1) (same).
86. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904 (1979) (duty to correct prior statements
that become materially incorrect; action dismissed on grounds that section 18 of Exchange
Act provided exclusive remedy and failure to plead with particularity), rev'd, 607 F.2d 545 (2d
Cir. 1979); cf. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 221 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1069 (1978) (noting that commentators suggest that rule 10b-5 is adequate basis for affirma-
tive duty to disclose). But see State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843,
850-51 (2d Cir. 1981) (company has no duty to correct rumors not attributable to company);
Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1982) (no duty to disclose preliminary merger
discussions if not trading); Schlanger v. Four-Phase Systems, Inc., [Current Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,724, at 97,947 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (motion for summary judgment
denied; no duty to announce inchoate merger discussions). See generally Bauman, Rule lOb-5
and the Corporation's Affinatve Duty to Disclose, 67 GEo. L.J. 935 (1979) (suggesting that rule
lOb-5 imposes duty of prompt disclosure of material events); Talesnick, Corporate Silence and
Rule IOb-5: Does a Pubh'cy Held Corporation Have an Afftrmative Obhgation to Disclose?, 49 DEN.
L.J. 369 (1973) (same).
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disclosure, as well as the nature of legitimate business justifications for
failure to disclose material information promptly, are presented by such
an approach. 7 The Court's assumption that analysts need and have a
right to material, nonpublic information prior to the rest of the public
may stem in part from a desire to avoid burdening the corporation with
a disclosure requirement. But, it is arguable that the burden in this area
should fall largely on the corporation and not on its shareholders. At
least, these considerations should be analyzed before preference is given
to one of the competing interests.
The Dirks Court, however, finds it sufficient to refer to "the central
role . . .that analysts . . .play in revealing information that corpora-
tions may have reason to withhold from the public .. ."8 It never
asks the questions: If a corporation has a legitimate reason to withhold
information, why should an analyst be allowed to reveal or use it, or if it
has no legitimate interest in confidentiality of certain information, then
why should the information not be disclosed equally to all shareholders,
if to any? Without addressing whether, in the proper case, some expan-
sion of the obligation of affirmative corporate disclosure would be a
more appropriate means of ensuring pricing efficiency, the Court creates
the possibility that an uninformed shareholder will be trading with an
analyst or its client who has received material information directly from
the shareholder's company.
Perhaps more significant than freeing analysts from liability for the
use of nonpublic information, is what the Court's rules do to clarify the
liability of insiders and to adjust the risks attendant to discussing non-
public information with outsiders. Prior to Dirks, even if an insider re-
ceived no conceivable benefit from disclosure of information to an
analyst-or, indeed, even if he disclosed information pursuant to com-
pany policy or direction-he (and the corporation) could be liable
under rule 10b-5. 9 It is at this level that Dirks creates the greater poten-
tial for freeing confidential corporate information. While Dirks allows
analysts to pursue corporate information more aggressively, without fear
of liability if they are successful in dislodging something material, insid-
87. See Bauman, supra note 86, at 948-62; Ta~esnick, supra note 86, at 407-11. Of course,
these issues were not raised in Dirks. But if the perceived need for prompt reflection of non-
public corporate information is the Court's main concern, it should have considered other
possible ways of meeting that concern before resolving the issue at the expense of corporate
shareholders.
88. 103 S. Ct. at 3263 n.18.
89. Ste Elkind v. Liggett & Meyers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165-68 (2d Cir. 1980) (corporation
liable for tippee trading resulting from authorized discussion with analyst); SEC v. Geon
Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) (insider and company liable because disclosure
within scope of duties).
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ers may be more amenable to analysts' overtures, since they too escape
liability, absent personal benefit. Thus, the Court has shifted the risks
associated with the market's quest for nonpublic information away from
the corporate insiders and analysts (who would be liable for passing the
information or would be unable to trade on it under the SEC's view) to
the shareholders-who, after Dirks, are fair game for an informationally
loaded analyst.'
D. Uncertainty Resultingfrom the Quest for Certainty
The Court's "personal benefit" test for determining when an insider
has breached his duty in tipping information, seems largely an attempt
to avoid what the Court views as the "inherently imprecise" nature of
the SEC's rule9" and to establish some certainty for liability under rule
10b-5. Yet, the Court finds itself admitting that the new rule will in fact
cause uncertainty, and will "not always be easy," for courts to apply.92
Indeed, the Court immediately creates a per se rule:
The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of non-
public information also exist when an insider makes a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend. The
tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed
by a gift of the profits to the recipient.93
Even this attempt at specificity immediately raises a question:
When does an analyst become a "friend" for purposes of the Court's per
se rule? The question aptly illustrates the uncertainty injected into the
law of trading on inside information which will result from a search for
a definition of the Court's personal benefit test.
Uncertainty stemming from the anomolous and undefined nature
of a "personal benefit" is further demonstrated by reference to fact situ-
ations such as in Elkind . Lzggett & Myers, Inc. ." In that case, insiders
who were meeting with analysts disclosed nonpublic inside information
concerning, among other things, corporate earnings. There is no indica-
tion in the opinion that the insiders benefited from their disclosure. The
district court had found that the corporation routinely "gave inside tips
to analysts in order 'to cultivate good relationships with selected finan-
90. This is not to suggest that some self-policing will not occur. Indeed, if an analyst with
inside information has direct contact with a buyer or seller, he may incur a duty to disclose
based on rule lOb-5(b), which prohibits misleading statements.
91. 103 S. Ct. at 3263.
92. Id. at 3266.
93. Id.
94. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
[VOL. 43:292
A STUDY IN CAUSE AND EFFECT
cial analysts who followed Liggett.' "" Even if the insiders had invested
in the corporation's stock and thus could be presumed to be attempting
to induce a market movement favorable to their position, they could
simply await the corporation's normal earnings announcement-which
in the Elkind case followed the violative tippee trading by only one day.
Under such circumstances, the mere holding of a position in the corpo-
ration's securities could not easily be linked to an improper attempt to
benefit through "tipping."9 6 Nevertheless, Elk'nd considered the selec-
tive disclosure of earnings a violation of rule lOb-5, prior to Dirks.9 7
Under the "benefit" test, it is likely that no liability would attach.9"
Until the courts have more clearly defined the type of personal ben-
efit which will establish liability, even cases such as Elkid, which other-
wise seem clearly to fall within the protection intended to be afforded
insiders by Dirks, are subject to uncertainty. For example, it is conceiva-
ble that an insider would be deemed to have gained a personal benefit
from tipping if the recipient is an analyst at a brokerage firm which has
given the insider a favorable commission rate or an opportunity to par-
ticipate in a desirable initial public offering in the past or which may do
so in the future. If an analyst is employed by a financial publication,
the insider must also consider whether a personal benefit could be al-
95. Id. at 167.
96. See, e.g., State Teacher's Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., [Current Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,601 (S.D.N.Y. motion for summary judgment denied Dec. 12,
1983). In denying defendants' motions for summary judgment, after Dirks, as to a claim for
improper tipping, the court noted, but did not hold, that various factors in the case, including
the technicality of the issues involved, "provide strong temptation, if not compulsion, to reach
the legal conclusion that proof of stock ownership alone and performance of an assigned duty
cannot suffice to constitute the personal or reputational benefit described in Dirks." Id. at
97,361.
97. 635 F.2d at 168.
98. Absent an imminent corporate announcement of the information tipped, the insider
could be seen as having personally benefited from the perceived benefit to the corporation in
cultivating good relationships with the analyst, especially if the insider is also a stockholder
and will benefit from increased trading in the company's stock. Such a view is difficult to
reconcile with the policy of Dirks because it would seem to fulfill the benefit test in almost
every case-insiders are also usually stockholders. Any other view raises the problem of po-
tentially attributing personal motivation to insiders who tip analysts, which will be difficult to
uncover. The Court views its test as an objective one that involves reference to "objective
criteria" such as "pecuniary gain or reputational benefit that will translate into future earn-
ings." 103 S. Ct. at 3266. The above analysis, however, points to the danger of using a vague
"personal benefit" test to judge the conduct of fiduciaries who have potentially conflicting
motivations and the means and discretion available to disguise those motivations. See infia
note 109. For these very reasons, absolute liability for "short-swing" trading profits by "insid-
ers" was imposed under section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). See
STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY,
S. REP. No. 1455, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., 55 (1934).
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leged based on a past article favorable to the insider's reputation or the
potential for such an article in the future.
Further uncertainty stems from the practical considerations attend-
ant to directing corporate actions under the rule. It is yet to be seen how
insiders will fair under the possible increased pressure on them to dis-
close nonpublic information. This pressure may result from competition
to maintain a following of analysts, which can be important to retaining
strength in demand for the corporation's stock and the market confi-
dence which truly objective analysis by such professionals brings to bear.
Should insiders easily succumb, the danger that premature, inconsistent,
or incomplete information will be disclosed increases. Liability can re-
sult for both the corporation and for insiders who trade while such infor-
mation is uncorrected.99 On the other hand, there will be pressure to
maintain confidentiality, not only due to normal business needs, but
from the interplay of possible state law liabilities,' 0 stock exchange con-
tractual obligations,I and considerations of corporate integrity in the
eyes of the public. These uncertainties will remain until the Dirks per-
sonal benefit test is more clearly defined.
The Court's response to the dissent's and SEC's concern that the
benefit test permits an insider to fabricate easily "some ostensibly legiti-
mate business justification for transmitting the information" suggests
another uncertainty in rule lOb-5 liability.I0 2 Although the Court states
99. See, e.g., Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. demed, 395 U.S. 903
(1969) (liability even absent trading); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 858-62, 864
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (liability for ambiguous general
statement); HSC, Inc. v. Daniels, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,557 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (corporation liable under "fraud on market" theory even in absence of
direct reliance on the inaccurate statements by those trading); see also Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 20,560 (Jan. 13, 1984) (reminding registrants that the antifraud provisions apply
to all statements by company spokespersons, even if made in private, that can reasonably be
expected to reach investors).
100. Cf. Broply v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241-243, 70 A.2d 5, 7, 8 (1949) (fiduciary
may not trade on own account when possessing knowledge from beneficiary); Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 497-98, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912-13, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80-81 (N.Y.
1969) (allowing action by issuer to recover profits from trading insiders because corporation
has interest in reputation to ensure market-ability of securities). Although Diamond and
Broply both reasoned that one in a relationship of trust and confidence should not be allowed
to benefit personally from access to inside information, the rational of those cases easily ex-
tends to an insider trading on unauthorized tips from which, under Drks, he does not benefit.
That is, an unauthorized tip may damage the company's reputation of integrity as quickly as
an insider trading on, or personally benefiting from, inside information.
101. N.Y.S.E. COMPANY MANUAL, §§ A2, A-20 (corporate employees, directors, and of-
ficers must not disclose confidential information they may receive in the course of their du-
ties); A.M.E.X. COMPANY GUIDE, Part 4, §§ 403, 403(6) (everyone who possesses material,
nonpublic inside information is considered an insider under the A.M.E.X. policies).
102. 103 S. Ct. at 3265.
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that in determining whether the insider's purpose in disclosing is fraudu-
lent, "the SEC and the Courts are not required to read the parties'
minds," ' it states in a footnote:
Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, . . . motivation is not
irrelevant to the issue of scienter. It is not enough that an insider's
conduct results in harm to investors; rather, a violation may be
found only where there is "intentional or wil4lul conduct designed
to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially af-
fecting the price of securities."' 0 4
To the extent that inquiry into motivation is inconsistent with a stan-
dard of recklessness or knowing misconduct, the Court's statement sug-
gests that something less than specific intent will not satisfy the scienter
requirement of rule lOb-5.1
0 5
E. Suggested Judicial Response
The Court justifies its new tippee-liability rules by reference to two
goals: enhancement of certainty for insiders and analysts in dealing
with disclosure of material information, t1 n and assurance of prompt re-
103. Id.
104. Id at 3265 n.23 (emphasis added).
105. The SEC must prove scienter in injunction actions under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
and under section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act, but not under section 17(a)(2) & (3). Aaron
v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691, 697 (1980). In Aaron, the Court did not define what constitutes
scienter, but stated that section 10(b) "quite clearly evinced a congressional intent to pro-
scribe only 'knowing or intentional conduct.' " Id. at 690 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-99 (1976)). Thereafter, various courts have interpreted the
scienter requirement to require something less than a specific intent to defraud. See SEC v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 77 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980) ("knowl-
edge of what one is doing and the consequences of those actions suffices"); Edward I. Mawod
& Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir. 1979) (Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976) "does not require that there be premeditated malice."); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon
& Co., 570 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978) (scienter has been defined
as "knowing or intentional misconduct," but "knowing" implies conduct which is something
less than intentional); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334 (5th Cir. 1978) (" 'knowing' conduct
satisfies the scienter requirement"); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 273
(3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979) ("[participation] in . . . a scheme with full
knowledge of the consequences of [one's] act" satisfies the scienter requirement); Nelson v.
Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337-38 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978) (requires only that
misstatements or omissions be made "with knowledge"); Berdahl v. SEC, 572 F.2d 643, 647
(8th Cir. 1978) (petitioner's knowledge sufficient to constitute scienter, no clarification of stan-
dard for knowledge); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 n.16 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977), ("scienter short of specific intent is sufficient").
106. 103 S. Ct. at 3263 nn.17-18, 3266 n.24. When the Court discusses the need for its
personal benefit test, the only examples of permissable disclosure that it presents are those in
which it is not "clear-either to the corporate insider or the recipient analyst-whether the
information [is] material nonpublic information," and in which "[insiders] mistakenly think
the information already [is] disclosed or . . . not material." Id. at 3265.
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flection of important information in the securities markets.' °7 But, as
discussed above, the rules increase the potential for harm to corporate
confidentiality, individual shareholders, and market integrity. More-
over, the rules cannot guarantee increased market efficiency and, by the
Court's own admission, foster new uncertainty of liability through
problems of interpretation and application. In light of these factors, the
lower courts should attempt to minimize the potential harm from the
rules and to inject an element of stability back into the once relatively
settled law of trading on inside or corporate information. This can be
done in several ways.
The most obvious approach to these problems is to attempt to de-
fine the Court's "personal benefit" test or to identify specific categories
of conduct that the test reaches. The Dirks Court itself begins this pro-
cess when it creates a per se rule or an irrebuttable presumption of per-
sonal benefit when "an insider makes a gift of confidential information
to a trading relative orjt'ind."'' a The potentially expansive net of liabil-
ity envisioned in finding a personal benefit to an insider by virtue of his
making a gifi of a tip to a friend suggests that a very small and, more
importantly, an intangible benefit will suffice."0 9
It would be consistent with this approach to bring potential reputa-
tional benefit within the ambit of "personal benefit." The Court seems
to anticipate this when it states that "a pecuniary gain or a reputational
benefit that will translate into future earnings" is sufficient to satisfy the
test." O But the Court's language seems only to envision a reputational
benefit which at least has the potential to become a tangible or pecuni-
ary one. Nevertheless, almost any reputational benefit has that poten-
tial, and the Court's statement should not limit the notion that an
intangible benefit is sufficient, because the Court does not purport to
107. Id. at 3263, nn.17-18, 3266 n.24.
108. Id. at 3266 (emphasis added).
109. Justice Blackmun aptly described the difficulty of discerning the motivations of a
tipping insider:
The Court's approach is particularly difficult to administer when the insider is not
directly enriched monetarily by the trading he induces. For example, the Court
does not explain why the benefit [which the insider who tipped Dirks] obtained-
the good feeling of exposing a fraud and his enhanced reputation-is any different
from the benefit to an insider who gives the information as a gift to a friend or
relative.
.. .The distinction between pure altrusion and self-interest has puzzled philoso-
phers for centuries; there is no reason to believe the courts and administrative law
judges will have an easier time with it.
103 S. Ct. at 3272 n.13. The issue may be more readily resolved by reference to objective
criteria, requiring corporate authorization for tipping before a presumption of reputational or
personal benefit is overcome.
110. Id. at 3266.
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give an all-inclusive list of possible personal benefits that satisfy the test.
Furthermore, bringing potential reputational benefit within the prohibi-
tion is necessary to provide for the situation of improper disclosure by an
insider who merely wishes to "puff" or benefit his reputation as "in the
know" or a "source." Although some pricing efficiency may be obtained
by such tipping, it also may cause inefficiency because if the purpose of
the tip is to puff one's reputation, the insider may be inclined to puff the
substance of the information conveyed.
This discussion raises two larger problems to be resolved under the
personal benefit test: Will the potential for any type of future benefit
satisfy the test; and will the insider be liable if he benefits, but the corpo-
ration had authorized the tip? If the answer to the first question is yes,
few may escape liability because it is as easy to conceive of potential
future benefits as it is to fabricate ostensibly legitimate reasons for pass-
ing inside information. Yet, if the answer is no, then all tipping insiders
escape liability except those who are so involved in the tipper's trade as
to reap an immediate benefit. The better result is to find a breach if the
insider seeks a future benefit. Indeed, when a future benefit is antici-
pated, the insider would seem to violate his fiduciary duty as clearly as if
he received an immediate tangible reward. The answer to the second
question is, under the literal language and the rationale of Dirks, yes.
Dirks rests on the Cady, Roberts duty to disclose to shareholders, not on a
duty owed to the corporation." ' Thus, acting consistently with the
wishes of the corporation should not be a defense to liability if the in-
sider has personally benefited. Furthermore, if corporate consent to or
benefit from the disclosure could cancel the liability of an insider who
personally benefits from his selective disclosure, then the Court's rule is
transformed into one which allows insiders to trade on nonpublic infor-
mation as long as the corporation approves-a notion the Court clearly
rejects.' 12
Prohibiting tipping where the potential for reputational or future
benefit is involved may create difficulty in application of the Court's
rules to situations which involve direct, authorized discussions between
corporate officials and analysts-discussions which the Court's rules
were seemingly designed to foster. But such cases can be resolved by
looking to the particular circumstances of each case to determine
111. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57. The Court distinguished between "[tihe
duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to trade on inside information
[ . . land] the common-law duty . . . to the corporation not to mismanage corporate assets
." 103 S. Ct. at 3260 n.10.
112. 103 S. Ct. at 3263 ("[flnsiders [are] forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from
personally using undisclosed corporate information to their advantage . . ").
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whether the tip was designed to benefit the insider. Corporate authori-
zation to disclose, although not automatically suspending liability, could
be a relevant factor for determining whether an insider derived a per-
sonal benefit from the disclosure.
This discussion demonstrates the inherent tension between the con-
cepts of market efficiency and market integrity, which the Court's per-
sonal benefit test exacerbates. Although "personal benefit" must be
defined loosely to avoid the problems that the permissive use of inside
information presents to corporate confidentiality and market integrity,
defining it too loosely threatens to chill the communication between cor-
porate officials and market analysts that the Court's rules are designed
to encourage. Because it is difficult to achieve definitional specificity in
the "personal benefit" test, these problems will emerge in almost every
case.
One possible solution, which does not directly involve defining
"personal benefit," is to create a presumption of personal benefit. Pre-
sumptions are often raised for valid policy purposes or to avoid
problems of proof, especially when the facts needed to prove a particular
matter are within the possession of or are more easily accessible to one
party. 1 3 Indeed, a presumption of undue influence is raised in transac-
tions between a fiduciary and the fiduciary's beneficiary specifically to
protect relationships of trust viz. those who are in relationships of trust
should be especially accountable for their conduct because the benefici-
ary may not have access to the information necessary to attack the fidu-
ciary's conduct.' 
14
A presumption of personal benefit in the context of securities trans-
actions between a tippee of an insider and the insider's beneficiaries is
similarly justified. Shareholders will find it difficult to discover their
fiduciaries' true motivations and expectations in tipping the outsiders
who thereafter trade with the shareholders. Raising a presumption of a
personal benefit would temper the problems created by the ease with
which an insider can fabricate an ostensibly legitimate business purpose
for disclosing nonpublic information. A general presumption of per-
sonal benefit to a tipping insider also helps to preserve the corporation's
legitimate interest in its confidential information and allows it to retain
113. See Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 255, 257-59 (1937); see also Don D. An-
derson & Co. v. SEC., 423 F.2d 813, 817 (10th Cir. 1970) ("presumption" that stock which
was used in computing net capital requirements under SEC regulations was not readily con-
vertible into cash because of absence of a professional market and petitioners were more likely
to have knowledge of a ready market than SEC).
114. Comment, Presumptions in Texas." A Study in Irrational Juy Control, 52 TEX. L. REV.
1329, 1342-82 (1974) (discussing examples of presumption of undue influence in transactions
between a fiduciary and beneficiary).
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more control over disclosure of that information. If an insider shows
either that the release of information was authorized or that it substan-
tially benefited market efficiency-the Dirks Court's main goal-then
the burden of proving actual benefit would shift back to the plaintiff.
A presumption of personal benefit is consistent with the Dirks
Court's reasoning. The Cad, Roberts duty to shareholders, as viewed by
the Dirks Court in forming its rules of tippee liability, is primarily based
on the unfairness of allowing an insider to take advantage of corporate
information. 15 Thus, the corporation and its shareholders, who may be
damaged by unauthorized disclosure even if an insider does not improp-
erly benefit, should be protected by a presumption that the insider bene-
fited, i.e., that there is some unfairness in the insider's use of the
information. This is especially so in light of the remedial purposes of the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws and the clear policy of
enhancing market integrity expressed in the Exchange Act.
The policy underlying the only explicit prohibition of trading on
inside information by insiders under the Exchange Act--section 16(b)-
also supports this approach. That section provides that, "For the pur-
pose of preventing unfair use of information which may have been ob-
tained" by officers, directors, or holders of ten percent of an issuers'
registered equity securities, the corporation may recover all profits re-
sulting from the purchase and sale by such persons within any six month
period.'1 6 The section thus effectively creates an irrebuttable presump-
tion that such trades were with the use of confidential inside informa-
tion. Creating a rebuttable presumption of personal benefit to insiders
would be consistent with the Congressional recognition of the dangers
inherent in the availability and use of confidential inside information. 117
115. See supra text accompanying note 44; see also 103 S. Ct. at 3264.
116. Section 16(b) of Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1983), provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relation-
ship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted secur-
ity) within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in
good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial
owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security
purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six
months.
117. Justice Blackmun noted that the SEC's suggested rule could be construed to include a
presumption of insider benefit from tipping, but that the Court's rule requires a case-by-case
approach. 103 S. Ct. at 3272 n. 13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). If the SEC's rule included a
presumption, it was an irrebuttable one because no provision was made for a tippee escaping
liability on a showing that an insider did not benefit from the tip. The raising of a rebuttable
presumption of personal benefit, absent a showing of a lack of benefit to the corporation's
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Another logical extension of the coverage of the Dirks rules is to
prohibit spouses and perhaps close friends of insiders from trading on
information obtained from the insider regardless of whether the insider
breached a duty to shareholders.'" 8 This principle-the concept of
identity of interest-avoids the recurring situation in which an insider's
spouse or close associate inadvertently or innocently learns about a
merger, acquisition, or other material event and uses the information to
trade." 9 The insider may tell his or her spouse of an imminent, mate-
rial event to explain lengthened working hours or trips, or the spouse
may simply deduce the upcoming event from out-of-the-ordinary activi-
ties, a telephone call, or other conversations. Presuming this conduct to
be a violation of rule lOb-5 seems contrary to the Court's notion of lia-
bility stemming from breach of a fiduciary relationship, but the pre-
sumption of an identity of interest avoids the serious problems of proof
which these situations present and the potential for carte blanche use of
nonpublic corporate information when an insider reveals information to
a spouse or close friend for an ostensibly legitimate purpose. To allow
such trading would be to subvert the corporation's interest in
confidentiality.
Therefore, it appears appropriate and to be a logical extension of
the Court's purposes and reasoning in Dirks for the courts: (1) to hold
that both intangible benefits and potential reputational benefits to an
insider satisfy the "benefit test" for imposing tippee-liability; (2) to raise
a rebuttable presumption that a tipping insider has directly or indirectly
benefited from the tip, which should be rebutted by a showing that the
tip was authorized or has substantially enhanced market efficiency; (3)
to impose liability for trading on material, inside information by spouses
and certain close associates of insiders based upon a constructive breach
of the insider's duty, which is imposed upon them by virtue of their
"identity of interest" with the insider. In the absence of such rules, the
SEC's fear, expressed in Dirks, that it will be "a rare situation when the
shareholders, is not inconsistent with the Court's case-by-case approach. Allowing the pre-
sumption to be rebutted by a showing of authorization for a "tip" would protect the free
discussion between analysts and insiders which the Court seeks to enhance. Although the
Dirks Court did not discuss the need for a presumption of personal benefit, it is clear that it
viewed the use of the tipped information by Dirks as dramatically enhancing market effi-
ciency. See supra note 73.
118. Fleischer, supra note 48, at 1281; West supra note 78, at 245-46; Comment, supra note
55, at 1144.
119. See, e.g., SEC v. Kapachunes, No. 83-5368 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1983), (consent decree)
(action against tippees of chairman of board's wife, who allegedly gained information either
directly from or by overhearing husband; neither chairman nor wife were sued); SEC v. Na-
tional Kinney Corp., No. 80-3683 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 30, 1980), (consent decree) (wife alleged to
have tipped sister after learning of potential acquisition through husband's meeting at home).
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parties could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate business justifica-
tion"' 20 is indeed well taken.
IV. EFFECTS OF THE CHIARELLA-DIRKS APPLICATION OF COMMON-
LAW PRINCIPLES TO ALL TRADING CASES
A. Effect on Cases Involving Outsiders Trading on Market Information
As discussed above, the Chiarella and Dirks common-law fiduciary
duty approach to liability under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 in cases
involving trading on nonpublic information restricts liability. The ap-
proach presents special problems when there is no prior relationship be-
tween the parties to a transaction on which to base a duty to disclose.
Cases involving outsiders trading on market information, such as
Chiarella, thus are particularly troublesome. The primary issues are the
two issues which were raised in the second section of this Article and
which were left open after Chiarella: (1) Whether a duty to disclose may
rest on a basis other than a relationship between the transacting parties;
and (2) whether a theory of liability is permissible under rule lOb-5
which is not premised on any duty to disclose. At least one theory,
which has been used since Chiarella to impose liability on outsiders for
trading on nonpublic market information, may be available after Dirks.
Several other theories may be adversely affected.
The misappropriation theory, as adopted in United States v. New-
man,121 rests not on the breach of a duty to disclose owed to the issuer's
shareholders but rather on a fraud on the source of information by vir-
tue of the misuse or "misappropriation" of that information in breach of
duties of silence and loyalty to the source.' 2 2 The availability of the
Newman theory depends upon whether, after Chiarella and Dirks, liabil-
ity must be based on a violation of a duty to disclose to those with whom
one trades in the marketplace or whether a fraud on a nonpurchase or a
nonseller satisfies the requirement of rule 10b-5.
Although the Chi'arella Court stated that "liability [for nondisclo-
sure] is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of
trust and confidence between the parties to the transaction," 123 this lan-
120. See 103 S. Ct. at 3265.
121. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983).
122. Id. at 17-18. Although Newman does not specifically rest its conclusion on any specific
breach of duty, it is clear that duties of "honesty, loyalty and silence" were considered. Id. at
16.
123. 445 U.S. at 230. The Court also accepts the notion that insiders owe a duty to dis-
close to non-shareholders to whom they may sell the issuer's securities despite the absence of a
pre-existing fiduciary relationship. See id. at 227 n.8 (quoting Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d
46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951) (insiders assume fiduciary relation to buyer by
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guage is not dispositive of whether a duty to disclose is a necessary basis
for liability under rule 10b-5. Because the Court believed that the
charge to the jury had only covered the theory that the defendants had
breached a duty to disclose to the selling shareholders, it declined to
consider a misappropriation theory advanced by the government.
124
The Dirks opinion, however, offers new insight into this issue. Near the
end of its opinion when the Court applies its insider trading rules to the
particular facts before it and negates any argument that Dirks was him-
self an insider or had a relationship of trust with shareholders or officers
of Equity Funding, it states: "Nor did Dirks misappropriate or illegally
obtain the information about Equity Funding. 1 2 5 The Court's appar-
ent need to distinguish such conduct from the facts before it suggests
that it views misappropriation as a viable theory of fraud under rule
lOb-5. 126
Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion in Chiarella discussed a
theory of liability which appears to be based on the approach that mis-
appropriation of confidential information may be a fraud independent
of insider trading concepts. He distinguishes between two duties that
Chiarella "arguably" breached: "(a) a duty to disclose owed to the sell-
ers . . . and (b) a duty of silence owed to the acquiring companies.', 2 7
Stevens agreed with the majority that a duty to disclose could not be
virtue of sale)). The Court is thus forced to recognize that the common-law relationship
requirement cannot deal with the needs of the securities markets.
124. See 445 U.S. at 236 (refusing to consider alternative theory because of lack of jury
instruction). In various post-Chiarella cases, the SEC has pressed successfully the misappropri-
ation theory. In SEC v. Materia, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,526 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1983), the SEC sued an employee of a financial printer who
purchased securities of a takeover target, the identification of which he learned in the course
of employment. In an opinion rendered after Dirks, the court denied the employee's motion
to dismiss. The court held that Chiarella did not apply "because there the Court was not
presented with the question of the duty owed by a fiduciary, such as [the employee of a
financial printer], to the offeror in a tender offer. The prosecution's allegations in Chiardela
dealt solely with the defendant's duty to the selling shareholders." Id. at 97,027. The court
also stated that, "In Chiarela the defendant's criminal conviction rested exclusively upon alle-
gations of duties owed to selling shareholders." Id. at 97,028. Judgment was entered in
favor of SEC after trial. SEC v. Materia, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 99,583 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1983). See also SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (preliminary injunction against alleged tippees of an office services manager of a law
firm who was alleged to have misappropriated information about a tender offer by the firms
clients); SEC v. Brant, Civ. 84-3470 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 1984; TRO entered May 19,
1984) (allegation that newspaper reporter misappropriated information about upcoming arti-
cles that would affect the market); SEC v. Karanzalis, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 91,415 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (TRO against law firm proofreader based on allega-
tion of misappropriation of tender offer information).
125. 103 S. Ct. at 3267 (emphasis added).
126. See supra note 124.
127. 445 U.S. at 237 (Steven, J., concurring).
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imposed on Chiarella, but stated that "he unquestionably owed [a duty
of silence] to his employer and his employer's customer."1 8 Stevens
cited the "legitimate argument" that the breach of this latter duty "con-
stituted 'a fraud or deceit' upon those companies 'in connection with a
purchase or sale of any security.' "129 He also warned, however, that
Chiarella might not be criminally liable because the companies may not
be able to recover damages from Chiarella for violating rule lOb-5--
they were not purchasers or sellers as required for private rule 10b-5
actions.13 ° Saving the theory for another day, Justice Stevens followed
the majority and declined to analyze its viability further. 3 '
Arguments similar to those underlying Justice Steven's theory were
relied upon in Newman. The Second Circuit embraced the view that
trading on misappropriated information was a fraud on the source of
the information in connection with a securities transaction and was ac-
tionable under rule lOb-5. In Newman, the defendants were indicted for
criminal violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. It was charged that
Newman and his cohorts traded in securities while possessing nonpublic
information that tender offers for those securities were about to be com-
menced. 32 Several of the defendants were employees of investment
banking firms representing the offerors. The theory advanced in the in-
dictment was that the defendants directly and indirectly defrauded the
investment banking firms and the firms' clients by trading on informa-
tion that the employees obtained through their relationships with the
investment bankers. 33 The indictment specifically referred to alleged
128. Id. at 238.
129. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
130. Id;see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975) (only actual
purchasers or sellers of securities can maintain a private damages action under rule lOb-5).
131. 445 U.S. at 237-38 (Stevens, J., concurring).
132. Newman, 664 F.2d at 15-16.
133. Id. at 15. In several instances, the investment bankers represented the target compa-
nies. Presumably the information that the targets had concerning the imminent offers could
be seen as inside information of the targets. The government "belatedly" alleged that New-
man incurred liability as a tippee of insider information, but the court refused to consider this
theory because the allegation was not made within the indictment. Id. at 15 n. 1. After Dirks,
some complications are presented by this theory. The employees of the investment banking
firms (who tipped Newman) cannot be seen as having obtained information from an insider
of the target corporations in breach of a duty, because those corporations retained the invest-
ment banking firms, presumably for the purpose of assisting negotiations with the acquiring
corporations. Thus, there can be no tippee duty to disclose owed by the employees of the
firms; after Dirks, the duty must be derived from an insider's breach. The investment bankers
can be seen as having "become" insiders within the language in Dirks that "[u]nder certain
circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed legitimately to an under-
writer, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may
become fiduciaries of the shareholders." 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n. 14. Set infra text accompanying
notes 181-85.
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duties of "honesty, loyalty and silence" that the employees owed to the
investment bankers. 13
4
The Second Circuit, reversing the district court's dismissal,' 3 5 relied
upon the language of rule 10b-5 prohibiting any practice which operates
as a fraud or deceit upon "any person."' 136 The circuit court concluded
that the misappropriation of information by Newman and the employ-
ees of the investment bankers caused a "fraud or deceit" under rule lOb-
5 to be worked upon those firms and their clients, the acquiring corpora-
tions by "sullying" the reputations of the investment bankers "as safe
repositories of client confidences," and possibly artifically inflating the
market price of the securities of the takeover targets, thus rendering the
tender offer price proposed by the clients of the investment bankers less
attractive. 137 The court did not rely on the breach of a duty to disclose
but simply noted that in other areas of the law, "deceitful misappropria-
tion of confidential information by a fiduciary" is considered unlawful
or fraudulent.
38
The court thus treated the defendants' conduct as effecting a fraud
that was quite distinct from the normal concept of trading on nonpublic
information. Misappropriation is not a fraud on the other party to a
securities transaction, but on the source of confidential information.
This approach departs from the need to find a duty to disclose to the
shareholders with whom one trades, by focusing on the nature of the
conduct as it affects the interests of the source of the information.
139
134. 644 F.2d at 16.
135. The district court's opinion is unreported.
136. See supra note 3 for the text of rule 10b-5.
137. 664 F.2d at 17.
138. Id. at 18.
139. The breadth of an approach that focuses on protecting legitimate interests of the
source suggests that the more difficult question is whether a theory of liability under rule l0b-
5 that is based on a breach of any duty other than a duty to disclose to a trading partner can
fulfill the express requirement of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 that the conduct be "in connec-
tion with purchase or sale" of a security. See supra n9 tes 2, 3. The courts have usually fol-
lowed Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). There, the
Court construed the "in connection with" requirement to include deceptive practices merely
"touching" the sale of securities. Id. at 12-13. A relationship which has been described as
"very tenuous indeed." See 2 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIEs FRAUD & COM-
MODITIES FRAUD § 4.7(574)(3), at 88.34 (1979).
For example, in SEC v. General Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248, 1257 (D.D.C.
1975), the court found the "in connection with" standard met simply by the presence of
trading in the public securities markets at the time of the fraudulent acts. But cf. SEC v. Box,
No. CA-3-80-1217D (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 1981), rev'd, 721 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1983), the court
found, on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, that the mere fact that trading
occurred in the marketplace contemporaneously with the defendant's undisclosed kick-back
scheme was not sufficient to satisfy the "in connection with" requirement of section lOb-5.
The district court rejected the reasoning of General Refractor'es and relied upon Alley v.
[VOL. 43:292
1984] A STUDY IN CAUSE AND EFFECT 327
A possible objection to the theory that misappropriation of infor-
Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372, 1378 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980), in which the court required "a nexus
between the defendant's fraud and the plaintiff's sale of securities." The Fifth Circuit re-
versed because the allegations were not limited to trading by public investors only and the
court could not say that under no set of facts could the SEC prove a violation. See also
Chemical Bank v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 943-45 (2d Cir. 1984) (alleged fraud
by auditor in failing to audit financial statements of parent did not relate to value of subsidi-
ary which was pledged to plaintiff banks); O'Brien v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 593 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1979) (affirming dismissal against trustee of discretionary trading
account because no investment decision was effected by alleged nondisclosure).
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768
(1979), may well assist in resolving the issue of the breadth of the "in connection with" re-
quirement of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. In Naflalin, the Court reversed a holding of the
Eighth Circuit that for the government to sustain a criminal action under section 17(a) of the
Securities Act it "must prove some impact of the scheme on an investor." United States v.
Naftalin, 579 F.2d 444, 448 (8th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted). Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act is tracked almost precisely by rule lOb-5, but it prohibits only frauds "in the offer or sale
of any security." 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1983). This latter language seems, if anything, more
restrictive than the "in connection with" requirement of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. See
generally Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 After Naftalin and Redington, 68 GA. L. REV.
163 (1979) (discussing effect of two cases on scope of section 17(a)).
The Eighth Circuit's holding in Nafiahn was based on its assumption that the "funda-
mental purpose" of the Securities Act "was to protect investors from fraudulent practices in the
sale of securities." 579 F.2d at 447 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Naftalin's scheme
involved ordering the sale of securities for his account which he did not own ("short selling").
He hoped that the market price of the shares would decline before he would be required to
deliver them to his broker for delivery to the purchaser, so that he could actually purchase the
shares to be delivered with the proceeds from the sale, at a profit. When the market price of
the shares rose, Naftalin defaulted on delivery and the broker was required to expend its own
money to buy the securities for delivery, incurring large losses. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-2(a)
(1983) (requiring a broker, under certain circumstances, to buy shares which it sold for cus-
tomer who defaults on delivery of shares). Thus, in Naftaln, no investor, rather a broker,
acting as agent, was harmed. 579 F.2d at 447.
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's dismissal, refusing to read the lan-
guage in section 17(a)(3), which forbids conduct that operates as a fraud only "upon the
purchaser" into the other two paragraphs of section 17(a), which closely parallel rule lOb-
5(a), (b). The Court said: "The statutory language does not require that the victim of the
fraud be an investor-only that the fraud occur 'in' an offer or sale." 441 U.S. at 772. Refer-
ring to the enactment of the entire panoply of federal securities laws, the Court stated that
investor protection was not the sole purpose of the federal securities legislation, and that
equally important was "the effort 'to achieve a high standard of business ethics . .. in every
facet of the securities industr." Id. at 775 (emphasis added by the Supreme Court) (quoting SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)). Indeed, the Court noted that
Naftalin's conduct, and implicitly any fraud affecting a specific facet of the securities indus-
try, ultimately may hurt investors by, for example, inflicting losses or insolvency on brokers,
thereby resulting in higher fees or losses being passed on to investors, or harming investors by
virtue of the price and volume impact and market uncertainty that results from schemes such
as Naftalin's. 441 U.S. at 776-77. The conclusion of Nafa/in is easily applied to the seemingly
broader "in connection with" language of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
A more appropriate test may be whether the misconduct touches or has the potential
to affect a securities transaction or some aspect of the investment process or the proper func-
tioning of the securities markets. The District Court for the Southern District of New York,
subsequent to Dirks, has accepted the Newman misappropriation theory without questioning
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mation itself violates rule 10b-5 is that the only deception that may be
involved in a misappropriation is a failure to disclose the breach (of loy-
alty or silence) to the person from whom the information is misappropri-
ated."4 In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 1 ' the Supreme Court held
that not every breach of a fiduciary duty is actionable under rule 10b-5;
some element of manipulation or deception must be present.' 14 2 Com-
mentators have suggested that this requires an "inducement" or a
"trick," suggestive of the common-law element of reliance, 43 although
that element has long been removed as an obstacle to establishing a
violation of rule 1Ob-5 in cases of nondisclosure. 44 To adopt the New-
man theory may be tantamount to making an undisclosed breach of a
fiduciary duty actionable under rule 10b-5.
Various lower courts have seized upon a footnote in the Santa Fe
opinion to hold that an undisclosed breach of a fiduciary duty upon
which shareholders could have acted (e.g., by seeking redress in state
court) satisfies the deception requirement.' 4 5 The Santa Fe Court itself
speaks in terms of "nondisclosure" by a fiduciary as concomittant with
deception. 4 6 One commentator has suggested that the only deception
in any "insider trading" case involving an open market transaction is a
failure to disclose the misuse of the information. 47
In Chiarella, the Court did not discuss the source of "deception" in
cases of trading on nonpublic information,' 4 8 but in Dirks, there is spe-
cific language which suggests that an undisclosed breach of a fiduciary
the "in connection with" requirement. See cases cited supra note 124. But see Newman, 664
F.2d at 20-21 (Dumbald, J., dissenting in part) (rejecting misappropriation theory because of
trend "to confine the scope of§ 10(b) to practices harmful to participants in actual purchase-
sale transactions").
140. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 9, at 46-47; Wang, Post- Chiarella Developments in Rule
Iob-5, 15 REV. SEC. REG. 956, 959-60 (1982).
141. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
142. Id. at 473-74.
143. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 9, at 46-47.
144. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972) (reliance not
required in case of nondisclosure).
145. That reasoning has been an important avenue into the federal courts in suits involv-
ing allegations against corporations, their officers, and directors for failing to disclose material
facts in proxies, tender offer materials, or other disclosure documents. See, e.g., Goldberg v.
Merider, 567 F.2d 209, 215-18 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). See generally
Sommer, The Progeny of Santa Fe or the Beat Goes On: Erts to Circumvent Santa Fe, 2 FOUR-
TEENTH ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 26 (1982) (discussing cases that attempt to avoid limits of
Santa Fe); Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 139,passim (discussing scope of rule lOb-5 liability
after Santa Fe).
146. See 430 U.S. at 471, 474 n.14.
147. Langevoort, supra note 9, at 7-9.
148. The Chiarella Court merely cited Santa Fe for the proposition that "not every instance
of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b)." 445 U.S. at 232.
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duty which results in a profit to the violator is sufficient to constitute a
deceptive practice under rule lOb-5. After noting that a duty to disclose
under section 10(b) arises from a "fiduciary relationship," the Dirks
Court warns that under Santa Fe, "[n]ot 'all breaches of fiduciary duty in
connection with a securities transaction,' come within the ambit of rule
10b-5."11 4 9 But the Court continues:
There must also be "manipulation or deception." In an
inside-trading case this fraud derives from the "inherent unfair-
ness involved where one takes advantage" of "information in-
tended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for
the personal benefit of anyone." Thus, an insider will be liable
under rule 10b-5 for inside trading only where he fails to disclose
material nonpubl'c information before trading on it and thus makes "'se-
cret profits. "150
If the "inherent unfairness" of trading without disclosure and making
"secret profits" is sufficient deception to invoke rule lOb-5 then the mis-
appropriation theory should be unobjectionable.' 5 t Of course, in a nor-
mal insider trading case, the insider is specifically breaching a duty to
disclose to shareholders. Still, when an employee or agent misappropri-
ates information, the agent's duties of silence and loyalty would seem to
provide sufficient bases for establishing a constructive deception if the
employee was entrusted with information in reliance on those duties and
he utilized it to obtain "secret profits."
1 5 2
149. 103 S. Ct. at 3261.
150. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
151. Id. This conclusion is further evidenced when, in defining when an insider breaches
his duty in tipping, the Court discusses the scienter issue, noted earlier above, and observes:
"But to determine whether the [tipping] itself 'deceive[s], manipulate[s], or defraud[s]' share-
holders, [citing Aaron], the initial inquiry is whether there has been a breach of duty by the
insider." Id. at 3265-66. In a footnote, initially concerning the scienter issue, the Court ex-
pands on this, noting that the issue in the Dirks case is "whether there was any deceptive or
fraudulent conduct at all, i.e., whether [the insider's] disclosure constituted a breach of his fiduciaty
duty and thereby caused injury to shareholders." Id. at 3266 n.23 (emphasis added). Once
again, the Court seems to endorse the idea that an undisclosed breach of fiduciary duty is
deceptive. It seems that it would require a smaller step to conclude that the misappropriation
of confidential information by a fiduciary for purpose of making "secret profits" is deceptive
and, therefore, violates rule lOb-5. Indeed, some active concealment of the conduct seems
inherent in the notion of realizing "secret" profits, i.e., there is some element of self-dealing
even though the defendant may not be strictly a fiduciary. In this sense, misappropriation
may differ from the mere breach of a fiduciary duty involved in corporate mismanagement or
other situations of simple unfairness.
152. See Langevoort, supra note 25, at 1264-66. He notes that courts generally state that a
conviction under the federal mail fraud statute cannot be based solely on a breach of fiduci-
ary duty and that some "active fraud" or "deception" is required, but "have by and large
accepted the notion that secretive fiduciary misconduct, at least to the extent it 'corruptly'
benefits the defendant, is the equivalent of an active fraud." Id. at 1264. The courts gener-
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Moreover, apart from any notion of constructive fraud which may
justify bringing misappropriation within section 10(b),' 5 3 the policies
underlying the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws are
broader than common-law fraud doctrines. The overriding concern for
market integrity expressed in the Exchange Act justifies viewing trading
on information which is misappropriated in violation of fiduciary-type
duties as "manipulative or deceptive" under section 10(b). The invest-
ment bankers and the tender offerors in Newman suffered no small injury
in the market process in which they were engaged. Just as clearly, the
danger for market confidence in that important process was vitiated.
The Newman misappropriation theory is not inconsistent with the
general principles of tippee liability in Dirks. Although all trading on
confidential inside information by insiders and improper tipping of in-
side information to outsiders is, in some sense, a misappropriation of
information, there is little danger that the Dirks test will be circum-
vented by reference to the misappropriation theory. For example, if an
insider passes information to an analyst without a breach of the insider's
duty to shareholders, (e.g., for the express purposes of publication of an
article about the issuer), and the analyst trades under circumstances in
which the insider receives no benefit, liability cannot attach under Dirks.
To hold the analyst liable for misappropriating the information to his
own purpose-even if the insider warned him not to trade on the infor-
mation until it was disseminated through the article-would require im-
posing on the analyst a duty to the corporation. At common law and
under the Dirks standards, as will be seen below, the analyst probably
has not incurred a duty of silence to the corporation. For present pur-
poses, it is sufficient to note that a relationship sufficient to raise a duty
of silence for purposes of the misappropriation theory would probably
not be found in the usual insider-analyst relationship.' 5 4 This will prob-
ably be true although it is arguable that a lesser degree of trust or confi-
dence should be sufficient to impose a duty of silence on an outsider
ally rely on United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1942), which
states that "[t]he actual deception that is practised is in the continued representation of the
employee to the employer that he is honest and loyal to the employer's interests." Id. at 678,
quoted in Langevoort, supra note 25, at 1264. This reasoning applies equally well to the New-
man misappropriation theory, and should surmount the obstacles of Santa Fe, even if that case
requires "active" fraud or deception.
153. See Langevoort,supra note 25, at 1253. "Seizing on the secretive nature of a fiduciary
breach and its violation of expectations, many courts simply have concluded that any breach
of fiduciary duty is a constructive fraud. ... Id. (footnote omitted). But he believes that
because of the concern in Santa Fe that federal law not supplant the various existing and
presumably. adequate state remedies for breach of fiduciary duties, Santa Fe requires "active
fraud." Id. at 1268-72.
154. See 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14; supra text accompanying note 139.
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than is necessary to create the affirmative, fiduciary duty to disclose to
shareholders. Because the Newman misappropriation theory presents no
danger to the common-law duty approach of Chiarella and Dirks, and
because it provides a means to outlaw conduct clearly harmful to inter-
ests protected by the federal securities laws, it should be accepted as
within the scope of section 10(b).
Chief Justice Burger advanced a similar theory of misappropriation
in his dissent in Chiarella."5 His theory, however, was based not on a
fraud on the source, but as with traditional insider trading, on a fraud
on the other party to the transaction. He posited that misappropriating
information automatically creates a duty to disclose to persons with
whom the misappropriator trades. This duty presumably is imposed by
operation of law, rather than as a result of some special relationship
between the misappropriator and his victims or a breach of duty to the
source from whom he gains the information.15 6 A modified version of
the Chief Justice's theory is that a duty to disclose to those with whom
one trades arises from breach of duties to the source by virtue of the
misappropriation. The availablity of the Burger theory, or its corollary
theory, depends upon whether Dirks and Chiarella require that the duty
to disclose arise only from a relationship between parties to a
transaction.
The Dirks opinion seems to foreclose Burger's notion of a duty to
disclose arising as a legal consequence of a misappropriation of informa-
tion: " 'Because the disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordinary, it attaches
only when a party has legal obligations other than a mere duty to comply with the
general antfraudproscriptions in the federal securities laws.' We reaffirm today
that '[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the relationship between parties
. . ' "
57Although facially contrary to Chief Justice Burger's theory,
this language still would leave room for the corollary theory: that a duty
to persons in the marketplace to disclose market information arises from
the relationship, or breach of trust, between a trading misappropriator
155. 445 U.S. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 240. ("I would read § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to encompass and build on this
principle: to mean that a person who has misappropriated non-public information has an
absolute duty to disclose that information or to .refrain from trading.") The Chief Justice
believed that the jury was adequately charged with the theory that Chiarella "unlawfully
converted" information. See id at 243-45. Although there may be some notion of breach of
duty in this concept of "misappropriation," Burger does not appear to require that the misap-
propriation be in breach of a duty other than a general duty not to steal. "[T]he [fiduciary]
rule should give way when an informational advantage is obtained . . . by some unlawful
means." Id. (emphasis added). Thus Burger's theory is more expansive because it potentially
would cover theft. To the extent Burger would outlaw theft of nonpublic information by
imposing a duty to disclose upon the thief, his view conflicts with Dirks. See infra note 171.
157. 103 S. Ct. at 3262-63 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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and the source of the information. But that postulate is inconsistent
with the Chiarella Court's view of a duty to disclose as based on com-
mon-law concepts of fraud, which require that a duty to disclose facts
material to a transaction arise not from any relationship, but from a
relationship between the two parties to the transaction."15
Other language in Chiarella and Dirks confirms this reasoning. In
Chiarella, the Court specifically stated that a duty to disclose for pur-
poses of section 10(b) liability arises "from a relationship of trust and
confidence between parties to a transaction." '59 In Dirks, referring to
Chiarella, the Court noted that the "requirement of a specific relation-
ship between the shareholders and the individual trading on inside information has
created analytical difficulties for the SEC [in tippee cases]." 16
In Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc. ,16 a private class action against the
defendants in Newman, which was decided after Dirks, the Second Cir-
cuit confirmed the view that a duty to disclose must arise from a rela-
tionship between the transacting parties, and explicitly rejected both
Burger's theory and the theory that a duty to disclose to those with
whom one trades might arise from a breach of trust to another party
through the misappropriation of confidential information. The plain-
tiffs in Moss were sellers of the stock of a takeover target that had been
evaluated by Morgan Stanley & Co. while investment advisors to the
acquiring company. Prior to the tender offer, an employee of Morgan
Stanley revealed the tender offer plans to one Antoniu who in turn told
Newman, a stockbroker. The three (the employee, Antoniu, and New-
man) then purchased securities of the target which they sold for a sub-
stantial profit after announcement of the tender offer. The plaintiffs
sued Newman and his two cohorts for violation of rule lOb-5 and Mor-
gan Stanley for failing to supervise its employee. The district court,
writing prior to Dirks, had dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim. "6 2 The Second Circuit, relying on Chiarella, quickly disposed of
the main issue:
158. See 445 U.S. at 228; supra text accompanying notes 31, 32; see also, e.g., Laventhal v.
General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 411-12 (8th Cir. 1983) (emphasizing need for rela-
tionship between the trading parties). The Chief Justice did not rest his theory on any spe-
cific relationship, and in fact specifically rejected the Court's suggestion "that only 'a
relationship between petitioner and the seller . . . could give rise to a duty [to disclose].'"
445 U.S.. at 243 n.4. See supra note 35.
159. Chitarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
160. 103 S.Ct. at 3261 (emphasis added).
161. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
162. 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1364 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 719 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1983). Plaintiff's
claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(1982) was also dismissed.
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Absent an "insider" or "fiduciary" relationship with the sellers of
stock, a purchaser has no duty to disclose nonpublic market
information.
In applying Chiarella's "fiduciary standard" to this case
[the district court] concluded that [the defendants] owed no
"duty to disclose" to plaintiff Moss and hence could not be
liable for a section 10(b) or rule lOb-5 violation . . . . We
agree. 1
63
The circuit court then rejected Burger's theory, that a misappropri-
ation creates a general duty of disclosure, on the ground that it was
contradicted by both Chiarella and Dirks. 6 4 It similarly rejected the
corallary theory, stating, in the district court's words, " 'plaintiff cannot
hope to piggyback upon the duty owed by defendants to Morgan Stan-
ley and [its client].' "'65 These holdings were both based on the
Supreme Court's reference to the common-law principle that a duty to
disclose can arise only from a relationship between the parties to a
transaction. 166
Despite this rejection, Burger's misappropriation theory may yet be
reconciled with the Dirks opinion. Dissenting in Chiarella, the Chief Jus-
tice stated that basing a duty to disclose on the misappropriation of in-
formation "follows naturally from legal principles [access and
unfairness] enunciated . . . in [the SEC's] seminal Cad, Roberts deci-
sion." 6 7 Moreover, the Chief Justice seems to have relied on more than
the unfairness of trading on nonpublic information that is the result of
mere access, stating that "[b]oth of these factors are present whenever a
163. 719 F.2d at 12-13 (citation omitted).
164. Id. at 16.
165. Id. at 13 (quoting 553 F. Supp. at 1353).
166. Id. at 13, 16. The rejection in Moss of Chief Justice Burger's misappropriation theory
creates the somewhat anomolous result of subjecting traders such as Newman to criminal
prosecution under the federal securities laws but denying any remedy to traders proximately
injured by their misconduct. The same court which had dismissed the complaint in Moss had
previously reached the opposite result on the ground that Chiarela did not change the section
10(b) standing requirement for a private action, i.e., that the plaintiff be a purchaser or seller
of a security. O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1186
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)(standing
under § 10(b) requires the plaintiff to be a purchaser or seller of securities).
In O'Conner the court accepted that even an insider of an issuer did not owe any duty
to disclose to a trader in standardized options for the issuer's securities, because the options
trader is not a shareholder of the issuer. Nevertheless, the court felt that since a fraudulent
practice under the Newman theory was alleged, and the plaintiffs, as sellers of a security, were
"within the scope of the statute's and the rule's intended beneficiaries" and had alleged "di-
rect injury" as a result of the fraudulent practices, they had standing to sue. 529 F. Supp. at
1186. The result is in direct conflict with the Moss decision.
167. 445 U.S. at 241.
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party gains an informational advantage by unlawful means.""16 Requir-
ing some breach of a legal obligation is consistent with the Dirks rejec-
tion of the parity rule and the manner in which the Court treats
tippees-requiring, in effect, "participation" in a breach of an insider's
duty. Despite this apparent parallel, any "unfairness" concept in Dirks
must be read to mean that it is unfair to allow a person to take advan-
tage of those with whom he is in a fiduciary relationship, i.e., sharehold-
ers of his corporation,' 69 and not simply that it is unfair to allow one to
take advantage of information obtained by unlawful means.
Nevertheless, the Court's explicit reference to the fact that Dirks
did not "misappropriate or illegally obtain the information" at issue' 7 °
leaves open the possibility that the illegally obtained information is al-
ways tainted under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 7 ' Indeed, Burger ac-
cepted the basic premise in Chiarella that in an arms-length transaction
there is no duty to disclose "unless the parties stand in some confidential
or fiduciary relationship."' 7 2 But he continued, "the policies that un-
derlie the rule also should limit its scope. In particular, the rule should
give way when an informational advantage is obtained, not by superior
experience, foresight or industry, but by some unlawful means."'
' 73
Such an exception to the common-law rules of liability adopted in
Chiarella would not be inconsistent with Dirks. Analysts would still be
168. id. at 241-42 (emphasis added). Though Burger quoted the same language from Cady,
Roberts as did the Dirks Court, see supra text accompanying note 57, he omits the limitation to
inside information and insiders.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
170. 103 S. Ct. at 2367 (emphasis added).
171. The Chief Justice joined the majority in overturning the SEC's censure of Dirks. Bur-
ger did not rest his theory in Chiarella on the existence of a special relationship, and in Dirks,
the Chief Justice did not add any thoughts about the theory. It seems unlikely that he would
join an opinion that could be read to conflict with his own views without a clarifying concur-
rence. There is some authority for the proposition that the court would treat Burger's misap-
propriation theory as a necessary adjunct to its relationship-based insider trading rules.
Commissioner Smith, concurring separately in Investors Management Co., 40 S.E.C. at 650 n.2,
advanced a rule of tippee liability based on a breach of duty by the tipping insider but noted
that his rule would cover situations of theft or discovery of a lost document containing obvi-
ously confidential information because "[a] duty not to steal or knowingly receive stolen
goods or exercise discretion over goods known to be owned by others exists toward the corpo-
ration even without the presence of a special relationship." The Dirks Court specifically em-
braced Commissioner Smith's reasoning concerning tippee liability arising from an insider's
breach, see 103 S. Ct. at 3265, and perhaps would also adopt his views concerning at least
theft of confidential information. Note that Commissioner Smith's view that theft violates a
duty to the corporation differs from the Chief Justice's view that misappropriation creates a
duty to disclose to the marketplace. The former theory could be used to impose liability in
actions under section 10(b) brought by the SEC or Justice Department, but the latter would
allow private actions. See supra note 166.
172. Chzare/la, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 240.
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allowed to utilize information received from insiders absent a presuma-
bly "unlawful" breach of the insider's duty to shareholders, and the
mere possession of nonpublic information would not create a duty to
disclose. The better view would be to allow an exception to the Court's
strict reference to common-law fraud and fiduciary duty standards to
outlaw the use of "unlawfully" obtained inside or market information-
whether or not a fiduciary duty is breached.
B. Effect on Cases Involving Insiders Trading on Market Information
The Dirks Court's reliance on the common law and its restriction of
the Cady, Roberts standards could allow insiders to trade with sharehold-
ers with whom they have a fiduciary relationship without disclosing ma-
terial market information. Ciiarella did not resolve whether an insider
who trades in his company's securities while possessing market informa-
tion concerning those securities has violated rule 10b-5. 1 74 But the Dirks
Court emphasized that the unfairness that the Cady, Roberts rules were
designed to prohibit is the unfairness of insiders taking advantage of "in-
side information intended only to be available for a corporate pur-
pose."1 75 If the standard is limited in this manner, insiders will not be
prohibited from trading with their shareholders while in possession of
undisclosed market information.
Information coming from a bidder concerning a planned tender of-
fer or from an outsider concerning a favorable contract about to be
awarded to the insider's corporation are classic examples of market in-
formation. Commentators writing shortly after Cady, Roberts expressed
the view that liability should be imposed in these situations, at least if
the information was communicated to the insider during negotiations
between the two corporations.' 76 Because the insider is a fiduciary to his
shareholders, it seems that he should not be allowed to trade with them
without disclosing material information concerning the value of their
stock regardless of the source of the information. He gains no less of an
174. 445 U.S. at 231-33.
175. 103 S. Ct. at 3260 (emphasis added). Although the Court did not distinguish inside
and market information or any legal basis, to the extent that these general principles are
applicable to all cases of trading on nonpublic information, Dirks may suggest that the entire
body of information not emanating from corporate sources is outside the proscription of rule
lOb-5. See, e.g., Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 882, 886 (S.D. Fla.
1981) (plaintiff not liable for nondisclosure because securities laws do not require disclosure of
non-inside information).
176. Seesupra note 55;seealso SEC v. Reed, No. 81-7984 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1981) (consent
to injunction by outsiders who allegedly learned of potential tender offer from persons associ-
ated with the target); SEC v. Fin America Corp., No. 81-0553 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 1981) (consent
to injunction by insider who purchased without disclosing agreement to sell at premium).
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unfair advantage over his stockholders if he trades on market informa-
tion about a proposed tender offer, than if he trades on inside informa-
tion concerning an unannounced dividend.
The reasoning of Afili'ated Ule Citizens v. United States,177 supports
imposing liability under rule 10b-5 on insiders for trading on market
information. In Affh'ated Ule Ctizens, the defendant bank had been des-
ignated transfer agent for a corporation that was formed to manage tri-
bal holdings of certain Native Americans. Several of the bank's assistant
managers helped the shareholders to sell their stock outside of the Na-
tive American community by actively soliciting and accepting standing
orders from persons outside the community.7 The plaintiffs charged,
among other things, that they were defrauded when these assistant man-
agers failed to disclose the existence of higher prices for the shares in a
resale market consisting of non-Native Americans. The Court found
that the bank's employees acted as market makers on whom the Native
American sellers relied, and therefore imposed a duty upon the bank's
assistant managers to disclose the existence of the more favorable market
to the Native American sellers."' 9 Aftih'ated Ule Citizens thus stands as a
case wherein persons with "special relationships" to those with whom
they dealt were held liable under section 10(b) for failure to disclose
material, market information. But Ailhated Ule Citizens is distinguishable
from the usual case of an insider dealing with shareholders in an imper-
sonal market to the extent that there was personal contact with and
apparent reliance on the bank's employees.1 80
If the Supreme Court adheres to the rationale that a special rela-
tionship creates a duty to disclose, then insiders should not be allowed to
take advantage of shareholders by trading on nonpublic information
concerning their securities, no matter the source of that information.
But if the Court sees its reasoning as limited to situations where an in-
sider takes advantage of information "intended to be available only for
a corporate purpose" of the issuer of which he is an insider, a contrary
result is possible.
177. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
178. Id. at 145-47, 152.
179. Id. at 152-53. This comports with the Dirks Court's refusal to distinguish between
insider and market information for section 10(b) purposes.
180. The Court could distinguish A.ftziated Ute Citizens on the ground that there was per-
sonal contact between the Native Americans and the bank's assistant managers. 406 U.S. at
140, 148-49. Cf Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 (reading Affiated Ute Citizens as holding that the
managers could not "act as market makers inducing [the sales] without disclosing the existence
of the more favorable non-Indian market.") (emphasis added).
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C Ancillaiy Effects on Notions of Assumption of Duty. Outsiders Trading on
Inside Information
Dirks creates potentially unmanageable difficulites for corporate
confidentiality in the common situation in which outside advisers and
consultants are given access to confidential information for limited busi-
ness purposes of the issuer. The nature of the relationship required to
impose a fiduciary duty to disclose on outsiders was an open question
after Chiarella.'8 ' Cases prior to Chiarella held that any relationship
which resulted in access to inside information imposed a duty to disclose
upon the recipient. 18 Thus, lawyers, underwriters and other consul-
tants, and even "close friends" of the officers of a corporation could be
found to have violated a fiduciary duty to shareholders if they traded
while in possession of information that the issuer revealed to them in
confidence. 13
Although the Dirks Court severely restricted the Cad, Roberts no-
tion of "access" as the basis for a duty to disclose, in a footnote it out-
lines the circumstances in which an "outsider" may acquire the duty of
an insider in the absence of an insider's breach of fiduciary duty. The
Court does not speak in terms of "assumption of duty," but rather notes
that " '[u]nder certain circumstances, such as where corporate informa-
tion is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer or
consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fi-
duciaries.' "4 The idea of "becoming" a fiduciary bespeaks the rigidity
with which the Court outlines the circumstances which permit such a
transformation. To accommodate the concept of "becoming" a fiduci-
ary-or more accurately "assuming" the role of a fiduciary-and still to
allow room for its standard for tippee liability, the Court must tightly
circumscribe the circumstances under which one is transformed into a
fiduciary:
The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that
such persons acquired non-public corporate information, but
rather that they have entered into a special confidential rela-
tionship i'n the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given
access to information solely for corporate purposes. 8 5
181. See supra text accompanying notes 28-40.
182. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 796 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. dented, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) (reliance on access, and other factors, to find insider status);
Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (friends of insiders treated as insiders
because of access to information).
183. SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974) (merger brokers deemed insiders); Ross
v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
184. 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14.
185. Id.
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Thus, the "access" test of Cady, Roberts, absent a breach of duty by
an insider in passing the information, becomes a requirement that a per-
son enter into a special relationship with the corporation itself to such
an extent that the two can be considered engaged in a common enter-
prise. The Court warns that the corporation must "expect the outsider
to keep the. . . information confidential."' 8 6 And finally the exception
must be objectively justifiable-that is, "the relationship at least must
imply such a duty.'"187
The significance of that latter caveat is soon evident, as the Court
apparently endorses the Second Circuit's decision in Walton v. Morgan
Stanley & Co.."' In that case, an investment banker was engaged by a
corporate client seeking to acquire a second corporation, and the second
corporation revealed certain inside information to induce a friendly ac-
quisition. After the proposed tender offer fell through, the investment
banker traded based on the information it had acquired during its dis-
cussions with the potential target. Shareholders of the potential target
sued, charging a violation of state law in trading on the nonpublic infor-
mation. 8 9 The circuit court held that state law did not foreclose the
investment banker from purchasing shares of the target based on the
acquired information, because the discussions created no common-law
fiduciary duty."9 The court's determination rested on its finding that
the information was passed during "arm's-length negotiations," despite
the request by the potential target that the information remain confi-
dential. 9 ' The court also felt that the parties were able to forsee the
problem and could have resolved it by a formal confidentiality agree-
ment-little comfort to those shareholders who traded with the better
informed investment bankers. 92 Thus, despite a clear expectation that
the information remain confidential, the Court refused to impose a duty
on Morgan Stanley because the formal relationships between it and the
issuer did not justify it.
The Dirks Court adopts and formalizes the rationale of Walton
when it states that for an outsider to take on a fiduciary's duty of disclo-
sure, the corporation must not only demand or expect confidentiality,
but in addition "the relationship must . . . imply such a duty."1 93 The
Court thus rejects any notion of assumption of duties by operation of
186. Id (emphasis added).
187. Id.
188. 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980).
189. Id. at 797-98.
190. Id. at 799.
191. Id. at 798.
192. Id. at 799.
193. 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14.
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law or by the knowing receipt of information even for an acknowledged,
limited, corporate purpose. Instead, the creation of fiduciary duties
must be firmly based in facts which effectively place the outsider in the
constructive employ of the corporation.
One post-Dirks opinion has potentially expanded the concept of
"becoming" an insider. In SEC v. Lund,'9 4 it was alleged that Lund,
president and chairman of the board of Verit Industries (Verit) violated
rule lOb-5 when he purchased shares of P&F Industries, Inc. (P&F)
while in possession of nonpublic information concerning a proposed
joint venture between P&F and another party.' 95 The chairman, chief
executive officer, and president of P&F, Horowitz, who was a long-time
friend of Lund, had proposed to Lund that Verit join the venture. 96
The district court first noted that, after Dirks, ihe SEC correctly aban-
doned its argument that Lund could be liable as a tippee; Horowitz did
not breach any fiduciary duty to P&F or its shareholders by disclosing
information to Lund because that disclosure was within the scope of his
authority as an officer and director of the company.197 The Court thus
viewed the disclosure as pursuant to a legitimate business purpose of
P&F.
Relying on the Supreme Court's discussion in footnote fourteen in
Dirks, however, the district court found Lund to be a "temporary" in-
sider of P&F and thus imposed liability.' The Lund court based its
finding on the facts that Lund and Horowitz were long-time friends and
business associates; they often exchanged information about their com-
panies; Horowtiz was on the board of directors of Verit; Horowitz told
Verit, through Lund, of the P&F joint venture because of their special
relationship; the information was disclosed solely for a corporate pur-
pose; and Horowitz did not expect Lund to use the information for his
own benefit or to make it public.' 99
The court's interpretation of footnote fourteen seems at odds with
Walton and may not fulfill the strict requirements of footnote fourteen.
It seems closer to the access approach of the pre-Dirks cases and is not
far from saying that whenever close friends exchange business informa-
tion they become insiders, temporarily, of each other's issuers. The only
added element is the finding, albeit an important one under Dirks, that
the purpose of the disclosure in Lund was to invite Verit into the pro-
194. 570 F. Supp. 1397 (1983).
195. Id. at 1399.
196. Id. at 1400 & n.2.
197. Id. at 1402.
198. Id. at 1403.
199. Id.
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posed transaction. Nevertheless, the court seems to expand the Dirks
concept that one becomes an insider only when involved in a special
relationship in the conduct of the enterprise. But, Lund is consistent
with Dirks to the extent that Dirks precludes trading by outsiders to
whom the issuer reveals information in an attempt to interest them in a
common enterprise or special relationship. Lund is distinguishable from
Walton because in Walton the parties did not contemplate establishing a
relationship to assist in the conduct of the target corporation's affairs.
The potential target corporation knew that Morgan Stanley was, in fact,
working for the potential acquiring corporation, and it was contem-
plated that the target's relationship with Morgan Stanley would always
remain arms-length, even if merger discussions were begun. The Lund
decision thus can provide an additional basis for imposing a duty to
disclose on an outsider who has no preexisting fiduciary relationship
with an issuer but who receives nonpublic information concerning the
issuer's securities without a breach by an insider.
V. CONCLUSION
In the first part of its opinion, the Dirks Court, by general reference
to the guiding principles suggested by Cady, Roberts and through modifi-
cation and interpretation of those principles as an endorsement of com-
mon-law concepts, refines the requirements of a duty to disclose and
announces that those requirements will apply to all cases of trading on
nonpublic information. The Court confirms its suggestion in Chiarella
that such trading violates rule lOb-5 only if a specific relationship be-
tween the shareholders and the individual who is trading establishes a
duty to disclose. But the Court raises additional questions, especially
about the status of trading on nonpublic market information by outsid-
ers and insiders. The Court also limits or, perhaps, eliminates the con-
cept of assuming a duty to disclose by operation of law. Thus, the
Court's opinion further restricts those situations in which a duty to dis-
close may attach to outsiders.
While seemingly endorsing the Cady, Roberts rationale, the Supreme
Court has all but forgotten the notions of fairness and market integrity
underlying that decision-the notions most important for advancing the
policies underlying the Exchange Act-and has thereby pulled interpre-
tation of rule lOb-5 closer to the common-law concepts which Congress
found were inadequate to protect the unique and complex securities
markets. Although the Court complains that the SEC's suggested rule
catches too much conduct, the Court's rule places virtually no limits on
the analyst-tippee's use-or misuse-of inside information. Once the
analyst receives the information without a breach of the insider's duty,
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he is free to use it in whatever manner he sees fit; unless of course he
independently violates the prohibitions of the securities laws.
The new principles of tippee-liability are based on the Court's per-
ception of a need for freer access to material, nonpublic information and
are designed to insure that market prices quickly reflect such informa-
tion. The Court reaches this conclusion without considering the alterna-
tives available, such as imposing a duty of prompt disclosure on issuers
or the creation of a duty to disclose by reference to the justifiable expec-
tations of the marketplace. With little concern for the inevitable
"losers" whose trades are sacrificed in the interest of pricing efficiency,
the Court's rules refer exclusively to common-law precepts despite the
paramount concern of the Exchange Act for the protection of investors
and the integrity of the market process.
